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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION
Daring the sommer of l9 lli the governments and t t e  peoples of 
Europe found them selves faced w ith  a c r i s i s ,  the th re a t  and the outbreak 
of a la rg e  sca le  war. The demands, needs, and the  leng th  of th is  war 
had not been a n tic ip a te d  by the b e l l ig e re n t  n a tio n s. The governments 
and the  peoples of th ese  nations were, in  the e a r ly  phases of the war, 
unaware of the  importance of th ese  f a c to r s .  Both the C en tra l and the 
A llied  Powers were c e r ta in  th a t  i f  a war were to  break o u t, i t  would 
l a s t  only a few weeks, or a few months a t  most. The b e ll ig e re n t powers 
were lik ew ise  unaware th a t  t h i s  war would involve th e i r  e n tire  
populations and th e i r  e n t i re  m a te r ia l output in  a l i f e  and death 
s tru g g le . The peoples of the f ig h tin g  nations were of the opinion 
th a t  t h i s  war would be fought by m ili ta ry  fo rces  a lone, a f a c to r  which 
was ty p ic a l  o f e a r l i e r  w ars, includ ing  the Franco-Prussian and the long 
and d ev as ta tin g  Napoleonic w ars.^
Even as the  people were unprepared in  th e i r  mental a t t i tu d e  fo r  
a t o t a l  war o f such d u ra tio n  and magnitude, so were th e i r  governments 
and f in a n c ia l  in s t i tu t io n s  unprepared in  th e i r  f in a n c ia l  p o lic ie s .  The 
e x is te n t  p o lic ie s  soon proved inadequate and incomplete fo r  coping
A lb re c h t Mendelssohn B artholdy , The War and German Society  
(New Haven, 1937), pp. 212-1^.
w ith th e  s i tu a t io n .  The means o f governmental f in an ce , or the  methods 
o f ob ta in in g  funds fo r  th e  continuous procurement of men and m ate ria ls  
fo r  th e  war e f f o r t ,  proved inadequate in  producing the desired  economic 
and p o l i t iq a l  e f f e c t .  While i t  i s  tru e  th a t  a g rea t war i s  a m atter of 
so c ia l o rg an iza tio n , p roduction , and d is t r ib u t io n ,  war finance i s  an 
im portant p a r t  o f the  war econony because o f i t s  p o l i t i c a l  and economic 
re la t io n s h ip  to  th ese  f a c to r s .  A comparison o f the  f in a n c ia l p o lic ie s  
and p rov isions as developed and u t i l iz e d  by Germany and Great B rita in  
during th e  F i r s t  World War period  i s  th e  su b jec t of th is  study — th e i r  
m ob iliza tion  and use o f f in a n c ia l  resources fo r  th e  procurement of m ater­
i a l s  and s e rv ic e s , t h e i r  use o f f in a n c ia l  measures fo r  the  lim ita tio n  and 
co n tro l o f  consumption, th e i r  d ire c tio n  o f new investm ent, and th e i r  
e f fo r ts  toward th e  prevention or r e s t r i c t io n  of in f la t io n a ry  tendencies 
Even b efo re  th e  a c tu a l outbreak o f war, the  b e ll ig e re n ts  en­
countered th e i r  f i r s t  f in a n c ia l  problem. This problem developed in  
th e  area  o f fo re ig n  investm ent and f in a n ce . The fo re ign  investm ents 
o f most o f  th e  European n a tio n s  and o f th e i r  n a tio n a ls  had grown by 19lU 
to  such an ex ten t th a t  any th re a t  o f war would cause public anx iety  as 
to  th e  s a fe ty  o f th ese  investm ents. During Ju ly  o f 1911|, as the 
d ip lom atic c r i s i s  deepened, a c r i s i s  developed among the  f in a n c ia l 
c a p ita ls  of the world. This c r i s i s ,  p re c ip ita te d  by fe a rs  fo r  the 
s a fe ty  o f investm ents, was enlarged the  economic interdependence of 
the  na tions involved in  the  war c r i s i s .  The pre-1911i economic in te r ­
dependence of G reat B r ita in , her co lo n ie s , and the  o th er nations of the 
world i s  perhaps b e t te r  known than i s  th e  economic interdependence of 
Germany. S ta t i s t i c s  show, however, th a t  th e re  was considerable economic 
interdependence between Germany and her neighbors. Germany was the  b es t
castomer of R ussia , Norway, th e  N etherlands, Belgium, Sw itzerland,
I ta ly ,  and A ustria-H ungary, and the second best customer of Great 
B r i ta in ,  Sweden, and Denmark. She was th e  lai% e$t source of supply 
of R ussia , Nwway, Sweden, Denmark, the  N etherlands, Sw itzerland,
I ta ly ,  Austria-Hungaiy, iRouWania, and B u lgaria , and the second la rg e s t  
source of supply of G reat B r i ta in ,  Belgium, and P r a n c e . ^ I t  is  
s ta te d  by Keynes th a t  around "Germany as a c e n tra l  support the r e s t  
of the  European economic system grouped i t s e l f ,  and on the p ro sp erity  
and e n te rp r is e  of Germany the p ro sp e r ity  of the r e s t  of th e  Continent 
mainly d e p e n d e d . T h e  f in a n c ia l  and economic d is ru p tio n  of th is  
system , caused by the th re a t  and outbreak of war had to  be met and 
overcome as one of th e  f i r s t  a c tio n s  in  s ta b i l iz in g  the in te rn a l 
economy in  o rder th a t  a system of war finance could be put in to  e f fe c t .
Following the  enactment of p rov isions fo r  combating the i n i t i a l  
f in a n c ia l  c r i s i s , ^ Germany ao3 G reat B r ita in  turned to  the problems 
involved in  the a c tu a l  financing  of the  war a c t i v i t i e s .  Both co u n trie s  
followed what they  considered to  be th e i r  b e s t in te re s ts  when ra is in g  
the funds fo r  the  procurement of the  men and the  m a te ria ls  necessary fo r  
the accomplishment o f a speedy and su ccessfu l term ination  of 
h o s t i l i t i e s .  While Germany re so rted  almost e n t ire ly  to  in te rn a l 
borrowing fo r  th e  financing  of her war expend itu res, G reat B r ita in  
u t i l iz e d  a combination of ta x a tio n  and borrowing fo r  her war expenditure
2john Maynard Keynes, The Economic Consequences of the  Peace 
(New York, 1920), pp.
^ I b id . ,  p .  IÎ4.
^ h ,lese p rov isions are  d e ta ile d  and discussed in  Chapter I I .
fin an c in g . A comparison of the percentage of t o t a l  German and B r itish  
expenditures in  the war period as covered by tax a tio n  and by borrowing 
shows th e  ex te n t to  which each method was u t i l iz e d  by these  two 
c o u n tr ie s ,^
Taxation & Other Borrowing
Germany 13.1$ 86.9$
G reat B r i ta in  28,1$ 71.6$
That th e  approaches of th ese  two governments in  the fu lf il lm e n t 
of th e i r  f in a n c ia l  requirem ents d iffe re d  i s  a t t r ib u ta b le  to  (1 ) th e i r  
d iffe ren ce  in  view point regard ing  indemnity payments, (2 ) th e i r  
d iffe re n c e  in  p o l i t i c a l  s tru c tu re ,  (3 ) th e i r  d iffe ren ce  of experience 
in  the financing  of previous w ars, and (1 ) the  d iffe ren ce  in  the 
governmental f in a n c ia l  s tru c tu re s .
Germany's primary viewpoint was th a t  a f te r  v ic to ry  over her 
opponents she would be ab le to  demand large indemnity payments from 
which she would be reimbursed fo r  her e n t i re  war re la te d  monetary 
ex p en d itu res , and th a t  she would a lso  rece iv e  s izeab le  land annexations. 
The m ili ta ry  and many of the  in d u s t r i a l i s t s ,  the  two fac tio n s  possessing 
considerab le  in fluence w ith in  th e  government, were swayed towards war by 
the d e s ire  fo r  annexation , and by the  knowledge th a t  through indemnity 
se ttle m e n ts , the  war would place no permanent f in a n c ia l  burden upon the 
country . A nnexationist war aims "were espoused by the pan-Germans, by 
the a sso c ia tio n s  of i n d u s t r i a l i s t s , . . .  and in  th e  Reichstag by a l l  the
^F or the f ig u re s  used in  computing th ese  percentages, see Chapter 
n ,  pp. h7 and U8.
p o l i t i c a l  p a r t ie s  except the  S o c ia l i s ts ." ^  Even th e  a n ti-a n n e x a tio n is ts
were in  favor of some changes in  boundaries or in  the taking of some
areas as hostage so th a t  Germany could f e e l  secu re .?  On th is  sub jec t
C hancellor Bethmann-Hollweg wrote in  September of 19US in a prepared
statem ent to  H erbert B, Swope, correspondent f o r  th e  New York World :
I t  never was a p a r t  of the p lan  of th e  war to  add to  Germany's 
t e r r i t o r y  through conquest, but i t  is  possib le  th a t  peace may 
n e c e s s ita te  a change of p re se n t boundaries of contiguous co u n trie s  
where such changes are  in  the natu re  of a safeguard to  Germany's 
s e c u r i ty ,  which in  tu rn  means a streng then ing  of th e  prospects of 
g en era l and la s tin g  peace, 8
The in d u s t r i a l i s t s  and the m i l i t a r i s t s  a lso  believed th a t  a peace
w ithout v ic to ry  was im possible f in a n c ia l ly ,  fo r  i t  would leave the
country  overwhelmed w ith  d eb t, and was im possible econom ically, fo r  i t
would a r r e s t  the expansion of German in d u s try .?
G reat B r i ta in ,  on the o ther hand, entered th e  war w ith  no 
d e f in i te  ex p ec ta tio n  fo r  e i th e r  indem nities or annexations. This 
d iffe ren ce  in  a t t i tu d e  can perhaps be a t t r ib u te d  to  the  predominant 
fe e lin g  among th e  population  of G reat B r ita in  th a t  th is  was a defensive 
war, B r i t i s h  in d u s t r ia l i s t s  and th e  B r i t i s h  m ili ta ry  were not in 
search  o f European annexations, nor d id they possess q u ite  the  
in fluence  w ith in  the  B r i t is h  government th a t  th e i r  co u n te rp arts  d id
^Koppel S, Pinson, Modern Germany (New York, l?^!*), p , 32h.
^H erbert Bayard Swope, In side  th e  German Empire (New York, 
191T), p.
^ Ib id , ,  p . 21,
9 lla n  J ,  P , T ay lo r, The Course of German H istory  (New York, 
1916), p. 1:67,
w ith in  the German Government,
Germany' s sem i-aa to c ra tic  form of government, as d is tin g a lsh ed  
from G reat B r i ta in 's  r e la t iv e ly  dem ocratic form of government, accounts 
in  p a r t  fo r  th e  p o l i t i c a l  d iffe ren ce  in  approach. Whereas in  a 
democracy the government i s ,  in  the l a s t  a n a ly s is , co n tro lled  by the 
w i l l  of the  people, th a t  i s  the wishes of a m ajo rity  of the governed, 
an au tocracy  i s  c o n tro lled  by the w il l  of the r u le r ,  or ru lin g  c la s s .
A democracy bases i t s  in s t i tu t io n s  on vo lun tary  cooperation tinder the 
m ajo rity  p r in c ip le  while an au tocracy  bases i t s  in s t i tu t io n s  on 
se rv itu d e . Even though Germany was not an abso lu te  autocracy, the 
system of governmental c o n tro l by the ru lin g  c la ss  was p resen t as la  
evidenced by the p rov isions o f the C o n stitu tio n  of th e  German Empire. 
The Bundesrat which was the  s tro n g er of the  two le g is la t iv e  houses was 
e f fe c t iv e ly  influenced by P ru s s ia , in  e f f e c t  an au tocracy , through 
17 of th e  $8 v o te s . This in fluence  was po ssib le  in  th a t  th e  Bundesrat 
possessed the  power of d ec is io n  over the proposals and dec is ions of the 
R eichstag . The C o n s titu tio n , in  a d d itio n , provided th a t no c o n s titu ­
t io n a l  amendments could be made i f  th e re  were iL vo tes ag a in s t them in  
the Bundesrat. The Empire was presided  over by an Emperor who was a lso  
King of P ru s s ia , and a C hancello r, a lso  Chancellor of P ru ss ia , who was 
resp o n sib le  only to  th e  E m p e r o r . I t  can thus be assumed th a t  as King 
of P ru ss ia  the Emperor could c o n tro l th e  17 P ru ssian  votes in  the 
B undesrat. The advantages of such a form of government were noted by
^% ouis L. Snyder, ed. ,  F i f ty  Major Documents of th e  N ineteenth 
Century (P rin ce to n , 1958), pp. lh3-k5»
voQ Kahlman, S ec re ta ry  of S ta te ,  in  a d isp a tc h  to  the  Im perial 
C hancellor from B rest-L itovsk  on January 10, 1913,
One of th e  most fo rtu n a te  e f fe c ts  of th e  m onarchical system as 
i t  e x is ts  w ith  us is  the  combination of the h ig h est c i v i l  and 
m il i ta ry  a u th o r ity  in  the person of th e  monarch, who is  thereby 
placed in  a p o s itio n  to  decide d e f in i te ly  and conclusive ly  the  
f in a l  q u estio n s determ ining the pub lic  w elfare in which, as o ften  
happens, p o l i t i c a l  and m il i ta ry  m atters  are  c lo se ly  connected.
I f  th e se  a b so lu te ly  fundam ental p r in c ip le s  a re  departed from to  
a co n sid e rab le  e x te n t,  the e n t i r e  fa b r ic  of th e  S ta te  i s  se rio u s ly
endangered,Ü
A fte r 1916, the Emperor became r u le r  in  name only and the a c tu a l 
c iv i l ia n  le a d e rsh ip , as w e ll as the m ili ta ry  lead e rsh ip , passed to  the  
m i l i ta ry ,  c h ie f ly  G eneral Ludendorff and the Gommapder-in -C hlef von 
H indenburg ,^  Thus the  m ili ta ry  became th e  supreme power in  both 
c iv i l i a n  and m il i ta ry  a f f a i r s .  Since th e  m ilita ry  leaders were mostly 
a r i s to c r a ts  and had an in te r e s t  in  c iv i l i a n  a f f a i r s  only in  so f a r  as 
they  a ffec te d  th e  a r is to c ra c y  and th e  m il i ta ry ,  th e re  was l i t t l e  change 
in  the p re v a ilin g  f in an c in g  program.
Because of G reat B r i ta in 's  more dem ocratic form of government in  
which the opinions and d e s ire s  of the lower c la s s e s ,  as w e ll as the 
middle c la s s e s ,  could and did re ce iv e  more immediate governmental 
a t te n t io n ,  the  B r i t i s h  government found i t  much harder to  enforce an 
unpopular law or po licy  than the German government. This is  
e f fe c t iv e ly  evidenced in  a comparison of the  B r i t is h  governmental 
ac tio n  in  th e  B r i t i s h  co al s t r ik e  of 19T5 in  the South Wales coal
3% alph Haswell Lutz, e d , .  The Causes of the German Collapse 
in  1910 (S tanford U niv ,, 193it), p, 31i,
12Edmond T ay lo r, The P a l l  of th e  D ynasties (Garden C ity , 1963), 
p. 239. '
f ie ld s  and th e  German governmental ac tio n  in  the German s tr ik e  of 1918, 
a s t r ik e  centered  in  B erlin . G reat B r ita in  proclaimed the  1915 s tr ik e  
unlawful in  accordance w ith  the p rov isions of the Munitions Act, 
T h e o re tic a lly  a l l  of t t e  s t r ik e r s  were l ia b le  to  imprisonment, but 
p o l i t i c a l ly  p e n a ltie s  ag a in s t a f i f t h  of a million men could not be 
re a d ily  enforced in  G reat B r ita in  and th e re fo re  the government a s s is te d  
n eg o tia tio n s  which brought about a se ttlem en t g ran ting  most of the 
demands of the m in e rs .13 in Germany, on the  o ther hand, the s tr ik e  of 
January 293S which involved more than  h a lf  a m illio n  workers, c h ie f ly  
in  B e r lin , was s e t t le d  in  another manner, A s ta te  of seige was 
proclaim ed, the labo r p ress was fo rb idden , s tr ik e  meetings were d is ­
solved by p o lic e , and thousands of workmen who were members of the 
Army Reserve were ca lle d  to  t h e i r  regim ents. Seven of th e  g rea t 
in d u s t r ia l  concerns were placed under m ili ta ry  c o n tro l, and the 
s t r ik e r s  were ordered to  resume work or su ffe r  punishment as prescribed  
by m a r tia l  law. Although, due to  th e  se rio u s  e f fe c t  of t h i s  s tr ik e  on 
the co u n try , Ludendorff was proim^ted to  w rite  th e  M in ister of War th a t  
fu tu re  in d u s t r ia l  d isp u te s  should be s e tt le d  ” *in general w ithout the  
employment of force,*** he did not ru le  out the use of force in  fu tu re  
disputes.3-U This d iffe re n c e  in  the a c tio n  of the two governments in  
s im ila r  in c id en ts  i l l u s t r a t e s  a fundam ental d iffe ren ce  in  the
l3K elth  H utchison, The D ecline and F a ll  of B r i t is h  C apitalism  
(New York, 1950), p . 138. --------------- — “
ik john  ¥ .  W heeler-Bennett, Wooden T itans Hindenburg in  Twenty 
Years of German H isto ry  l9lL-l93bo (New York, 1936), pp. Uil-h2.
governmental outlook toward th e  p u b lic , and in the public re a c tio n  to  
measures taken by th e  government. The e ffe c tiv e n e ss  of the B r i t is h  
government depended upon th e  support of a m ajo rity  of the pu b lic , 
B r ita in  was ru led  by a government of consent, Germany, on the  o ther 
hand, did not have to  depend upon the support of the  public fo r  every 
ac tio n  th a t  was taken . I t  i s  tru e  th a t  the c e n tra l  government of 
Germany had to  have public  support fo r  i t s  continued e x is te n c e , but a 
governmental c r i s i s  could not be as e a s i ly  created  in Germany as i t  
could be in^G reat B rita in  i f  th e  government were to  attem pt to  force 
a so lu tio n  to  a c o n tro v e rs ia l problem.
Experience in  f in a n c ia l  m ob iliza tion  and war finance a lso  
becomes apparent as one of the  most im portant fa c to rs  in fluencing  how 
th ese  two co u n trie s  approached these  problems of f in a n c ia l  m obilization  
and the a c tu a l war finance i t s e l f ,  Germany had no previous experience 
in  coping w ith  th e  i n i t i a l  c r i s i s  or w ith  the  financing involved iri 
an extended major war. Although she did have a p lan  fo r  f in a n c ia l  
m ob iliza tio n  fo r  th e  e a rly  war perio d , her f in a n c ia l  s tru c tu re  fared  
no b e t te r  under the th re a t  of war than did th a t  of Great B r ita in , Nor
did Germany’s f in a n c ia l  p o lic ie s  during the war envision  any change in
the financing  of her war expenditu res o ther than through borrowing, to
be covered by heavy indem nities lev ied  upon th e  defeated a t  the
conclusion of th e  w a r .^
I^Lutz, e d .. The Causes of the German Collapse in  1918, p. I 89.
10
Æ le ss  im portant f a c to r  in fluencing  the imthods used to  finance 
the war in  Germany and G reat B r ita in  is  ind icated  by th e  d iffe ren ce  in  
the means employed by th e  two governments to  finance th e i r  peacetime 
ex p en d itu res, Germany had a fe d e ra l  form of government w ith a t r a d i t io n  
of ta x  assessm ent and ad m in istra tio n  centered around the in d iv id u a l 
s ta t e s .  The Im perial government received  funds almost e n t i re ly  from 
in d ire c t  ta x e s , the  remainder coming from s ta te  co n trib u tio n s  and the 
income of the p o s ta l ,  te leg rap h , and ra ilro a d  opera tions, The one 
exception  to  th i s  in d ire c t  ta x a tio n  was the unprecedented 1913 
Parliam entary  approval of a nonrecurring d i r e c t  Im perial ta x  on r e a l  
p roperty  and some incomes. This ta x  was lev ied  in  order to  provide the  
funds fo r  a co n tr ib u tio n  to  th e  m ili ta ry ,^ ?  In G reat B r ita in , on th e  
o ther hand, the government had no r e s t r i c t io n s  of th is  nature in  regard 
to  a system of c e n tra liz e d  ta x a tio n . In f a c t ,  extensive tax a tio n  by the 
c e n tra l  government of G reat B r i ta in ,  even to include the income tax  
which had been imposed a t  various tim es since the beginning of the 
Napoleonic era  and had become acknowledged as permanent in  1907, was a 
recognized means of governmental f in a n ce .
l^Gustav S to lp e r , German Economy 18?0-I9li0, Issues and Trends 
(New York, 19li0), pp. 29-31.
l îp r o f .  Dr. Jo se f W irth, “D enkschrift Uber d ie f in a n z ie lle  
Lage des R eichs,"  Verhandlungen des R eichstags, I ,  ¥ahlperiode 1920, 
Anlage No. 25h, Bd. 363, p . 2.
^%amuel J ,  Hurwitz, S ta te  In te rv en tio n  in  G reat B rita in  
(New York, I9ii9)j p . 8.
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The s tru c tu re  of German finance could have been changed a t  any 
time i f  the ru lin g  c la s s  had so d e s ire d , fo r  th is  c la s s  c e r ta in ly  
appears to  have possessed the p o l i t i c a l  power necessary I t  refused  to  
recognize th a t  the war could end in  any o ther way than  a complete 
v ic to ry  and was w ell enough entrenched during the war period to  d efea t 
the  proposals fo r  a h ighly  progressive ta x  on large  incomes and fo r  the 
im position  of h igher death  d u t ie s ,  taxes which would have ca rried  
public su p p o rt, but which would have operated to  th e  f in a n c ia l  d is ­
advantage of those w ith  w ealth .
While ta x a tio n  and borrowing are  u sua lly  u t i l iz e d  in  r e la t io n  
to  t h e i r  p o l i t i c a l  advantages, they possess economic advantages and 
disadvantages which are  im portant in  viewing the p o lic ie s  and methods 
used in  the providing of funds fo r  th e  carry ing  out of a war. The 
funds needed can be provided d o n » s tic a lly  from one or two sources;
( l )  money taken out of c u rre n t incomes through ta x a tio n  or through 
n o n -in fla tio n a ry  borrowing, and (2) money created  by the banks or 
government. Money taken out of c u rre n t income may take th e  form of 
tax es  lev ied  on in d iv id u a ls  o r on b u sin esses, as income, p r o f i t ,  s a le s ,  
excise  or customs ta x e s , or i t  may take the form of a compulsory 
investm ent of funds a lread y  av a ila b le  in  government bonds or ob liga­
t i o n s .20 Thus c u rre n t income is  channelled in to  funds f o r  governmental
Î^Mendelssohn B artholdy , The War and German S o c ie ty , p . 272.
20por fu r th e r  d iscu ss io n  of n o n -in fla tio n a ry  borrowing, see 
Horst Mendershausen, The Economics of War (New York, 19ii3) pp.239-2LL, 
and Emanuel S te in  and Ju les  Backraan, e d i to r s .  War Economics (New York, 
I9li2), pp. 113-119. '
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spending w ithout producing an in f la t io n a ry  s i tu a t io n . However, new 
money may be c rea ted  through governmental borrowing from banks, s e ll in g  
promisory o b lig a tio n s  f o r  cash balances, or through governmental 
c i r c u la t io n  of new currency. This second method r e s u l ts  in  rap id  
expansionary borrowing or in f la t io n  and when a government f in d s  th a t  i t  
must r e s o r t  alm ost e n t i r e ly  to  th i s  means fo r  providing funds i t  
u su a lly  s ig n if ie s  the breakdown of the normal means of finance . This 
method of finance  i s ,  in  e f f e c t ,  a system of forced loans because i t  
reduces th e  buying power of money in  c i r c u la t io n ,  and when th is  new 
money i s  taken out of c i r c u la t io n ,  i f  i t  ever i s ,  the  buying power of 
money in c re a se s .
Perhaps th e  most im portant advantage of tax a tio n  over borrowing 
is  th a t  i t  can provide a means fo r  e x tra c tin g  funds on an a b i l i ty - to -  
pay b as is  and thus not operate in  favor of the w ealthy. A graduated 
ta x  can be lev ied  on incomes and thus ob ta in  funds on more of an 
a b i l i ty - to -p a y  b a s is  than  a system involving voluntary  loans which 
s o l i c i t s  funds mainly from the  w ealthy, payi%  them a fee in  the form 
of in te r e s t  fo r  the  usage of th ese  funds. I f ,  as in  th e  case of 
Germany, an indemnity se ttlem en t is  planned a t  the  successfu l 
conclusion  of h o s t i l i t i e s ,  th e  wealthy are th e  ones d ire c t ly  rece iv ing  
b e n e f it  because th e  war expenses, as financed through loans, are  paid 
out of the se ttlem en t and thus a d ev ia tio n  from th e  pre-war tax  
s tru c tu re  i s  unnecessary in  th e  war or post-w ar period . If  no 
indemnity se ttlem en t i s  planned fo r  th e  funding of the d eb t, a t  the  
conclusion  of the war the poor find  them selves paying an inequ itab le
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share unless an a b il i ty - to -p a y  b a s is  is  e s tab lish ed  in  the tax a tio n  fo r  
th is  deb t funding. Thus i t  appears th a t  a system of borrowing fo r  war 
finance a n tic ip a te s  e i th e r  an indemnity se ttlem en t or e lse  an in e q u it­
ab le  d is t r ib u t io n  of s a c r i f ic e s  fo r  th e  war e f fo r t  according to  w ealth 
s ta tu s .
Another advantage of ta x a tio n , or a system of forced savings, 
is  th a t  money is  withdrawn from c ir c u la t io n ,  an advantage not 
n e ce ssa rily  p resen t in  a system of vo lun tary  loans to  th e  government. 
This w ithdraw al of funds tends to  r e s t r i c t  both in f la t io n  and consump­
tio n ;  i t  l im its  in f la t io n  in d ire c tly  by making i t  unfeasib le  fo r a 
price-wage s p i r a l ,  and by making i t  possib le  fo r  th e  government to  meet 
more of i t s  f in a n c ia l  needs through ta x  re c e ip ts  r a th e r  than loan 
r e c e ip ts .  This system can thus reduce the p o s s ib i l i ty  of th e  govern­
ment having to  r e s o r t  to  a system of uncovered deb t or p rin tin g  press 
fin an ce . Taxation lim its  consumption in  th a t  i t  reduces the public 
buying power, which in  tu rn  u sually  reduces the public demand fo r  a 
g rea t q u an tity  of luxury item s. This reduced demand allows fo r  a 
d iv e rs io n  of a p a r t  of th e  luxury producing or importing industry  to  
the production or th e  im portation of goods more e s s e n t ia l  to  the war 
e f f o r t .  Excise and customs taxes lev ied  on luxury and import items 
during war tim e are  u su a lly  d i r e c t  attem pts to  l im it  the consumption 
of these  item s.
Even as tax a tio n  has c e r ta in  advantages over borrowing, 
borrowing has advantages over ta x a tio n . Borrowing allows fo r  an almost 
immediate a v a i la b i l i ty  of funds through the  passage of a war c re d its  
a c t .  Taxation not only involves a delay  in  the c o lle c tio n  of funds, a
Il*
f a c to r  which was p a r t ic u la r ly  ev id en t in  G reat B r ita in  in  th e  F i r s t  
World War, but i t  a lso  involves a much longer time period in  the 
le g is la t iv e  process due to  the  d e s ire s  of c e r ta in  segments of the 
p u b lic , aW th e  p o l i t i c a l  n e ce ss ity  of s a tis fy in g  many of these 
d e s ir e s .  This n e c e ss ity  fo r  s a tis fy in g  the d if f e re n t  segments of the 
pub lic  i s  p resen t in  both an au tocracy and a democracy. An autocracy , 
however, has an advantage over a democracy in  th a t  i t  can o ften  more 
e a s i ly  and more su c c e ss fu lly  m islead the public through th e  guidance 
of pub lic  opinion or thought in  a d esired  d ire c tio n .
Another advantage of borrowing over tax a tio n  is  th a t borrowing 
allow s the government to  ob ta in  funds earned p r io r  to  h o s t i l i t i e s  and 
held as sav ings, funds which would otherw ise not be av a ilab le  fo r  the 
war e f f o r t  in  a p o l i t i c a l ly  fe a s ib le  system of ta x a tio n . Thus both 
systems of war f in a n ce , ta x a tio n  and borrowing, have s in g u la rly  
d is t in c t iv e  advantages depending upon the  immediate need and the 
d esired  r e s u l t .  While G reat B r ita in  thought i t  advantageous to  use 
a com bination of th e  two, Germany p referred  to  finance war expenditures 
through borrowing.
R egardless of whether ta x a tio n  or borrowing is  used, a lim it 
w i l l  be reached as to  th e  amount th e  government can take from the poor. 
This l im i t  is  determined by the  income which is  requ ired  to  provide a 
su b s is te h t liv in g  and because of th is  l im ita tio n  on the revenue 
ob ta in ab le  from the poor, a g re a te r  p a r t  must be ra ised  among the W ell- 
to -d o , Whether th e  c o n tr ib u tio n  of th e  w e ll- to -d o  should be in  the 
form of loans or in  th e  form of taxes i s  the question  which governments 
in  wartime must dec id e . Under th e  ta x  method, the  w e ll-to -d o  carry  the
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major p a r t  of the burden, while under the loan method they are a t  le a s t  
p a r t ly  compensated fo r  th e ir  monetary co n trib u tio n  to  the war e ffo rt.
In the follow ing chap ters the methods and p o lic ie s  of G reat 
B r ita in  and Germany in  the f ie ld  o f ta x a tio n  and borrowing fo r  financing  
the procurement o f m a te ria ls  and se rv ices  during th e  F i r s t  World War 
w i l l  be compared. This comparison is  intended to  i l l u s t r a t e  how the 
p o lic ie s  of each government d if fe re d  because of the forenamed fa c to rs ,  
and how th e  p o lic ie s  of each government were modified during the  course 
of the war to  meet the  changing m ili ta ry ,  p o l i t i c a l ,  and f in a n c ia l  
s i tu a t io n s .
pp. 68-70.
21a . C. Pigou, The Economy and Finance of th e  War (London, 1916), 
CmPTER I I  
FINANCIAL CRISIS AND STABILIZATION
Before d iscu ssin g  the f in a n c ia l  problems encountered by G reat 
B r ita in  and Germany upon th e  th re a t  and outbreak of war, i t  is  
im portant th a t  th e  pre-war governmental financing  systems be understood 
and compared. I s  explained p rev iously  the source of c e n tra l  
government revenue in  Germany was lim ited  almost e n t ire ly  to  in d ire c t 
ta x a tio n , w hile in  G reat B r ita in  th e re  was no such l im ita tio n . The 
follow ing ta b le  g ives the percentage of the  t o t a l  1913 revenue y ield  
by ta x  source , and the  precentage of the t o t a l  expenditures covered by 
th is  ta x  revenue.
Percentage Revenue Yield
Tax Source G reat B rita in ^ 0Germany^
Customs 21.82 Uo.ii
Excise 2L.32 39.05
Inheritance  (e s ta te ) 16.66 2.71
Stamps 6.12 15.03
Land ta x , house duty 1.65
Income ta x , including supertax 28.98 -0 -
Other 3.07
IÔ0.ÛÔ "100.00
Percentage of expenditure coverage 100.00 87.39
^Ernest L. Bogart, D irec t and In d ire c t Costs of the G reat 
World War (New York, 1920), p . 38.
% . R. Kuczynski, «German Taxation P o licy  in  the World War,” 
Jou rnal of P o l i t i c a l  Economy, XXXI (1|923), p , 766,
1:6
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This comparison rev ea ls  th a t  th e  German government depended 
upon customs, ex c ise , and stamp taxes fo r  the  major p a r t of i t s  
revenue. I t  a lso  rev ea ls  th a t  Great B r i ta in ,  while rece iv ing  con­
s id e ra b le  amounts from in d ire c t  ta x e s , a lso  received  la rg e  amounts 
from d ir e c t  tax es  on in h e r ita n c e  and income. In both  budgets the 
r e la t iv e ly  high percentage o f revenue derived from the  customs tax  
which was le v ied  on import item s in d ic a te s  the ex ten t of import 
a c t iv i ty .  Also o f s ig n if ic a n c e , th is  comparison rev ea ls  th a t  in  
1913 n e ith e r  countiy  r e l ie d  ex ten siv e ly  upon borrowing as a general
3
and ord inary  means o f governmental fin an ce .
During th e  period  preceding th e  outbreak o f war, both Great 
B r ita in  and Germary were engaged in  in te rn a tio n a l finance and in  fo r ­
eign and domestic investm ent f o r  th e  fu rth eran ce  of in te rn a l develop­
ment and f o r  the promotion of even more fo re ig n  tra d e . In such a 
s i tu a t io n ,  a war sca re  would i n i t i a t e  a c r i s i s  in  which in v esto rs  would 
attem pt to  recover th e i r  investm ents, both fo re ign  and domestic, by- 
s e ll in g  th e i r  s e c u r i t ie s  befo re  they became frozen  or l o s t  due to  the 
breakdown o f th e  f a c i l i t i e s  fo r  in te rn a tio n a l f in an ce . Those holding 
b i l l s  o f  exchange would lik ew ise  attem pt to  recover th e i r  investm ent 
b efo re  a war s i tu a t io n  made recovery o f th is  investm ent im possible.
% to lp e r  in  German Bconocy 1870-19^0, p. 30, gives th e  Reich 
debt as o f October 1 , 1913 as h ,897,000,000 marks, and F . W. H irst 
and J .  B. A llen in  B r i t is h  War Budgets (London, 1926), p. l i t ,  give 
th e  B r i t i s h  debt as o f  liarch ^1, Î91I}., as 651,000,000 pounds s te r l in g .
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Ib i s  th e re fo re  anderstandable th a t  in  Ju ly  of even
before the Austro-Hungarian ultim atum  was delivered  to  S erb ia , an 
uneasiness appeared in  the f in a n c ia l  cen te rs  of Vienna, B e rlin , New 
York, and P a r is  in  the form of an  unusual volume of s e c u r it ie s  
se llin g .b  This in c id en t was only the f i r s t  symptom of a developing 
f in a n c ia l  c r i s i s  which would have to  be s ta b i l iz e d  before an 
e f fe c t iv e  means of governmental finance fo r  war could be introduced 
and c a rrie d  o u t. No government can su ccess fu lly  in s t i tu te  e i th e r  a 
new tax  or borrowing program while investm ents are d ep rec ia tin g  in  
v a lue , banks a re  experiencing  runs on d e p o s its , and in d u s tr ie s  have 
no place to  borrow to  meet immediate expenditu res.
The man most c lo se ly  a sso c ia ted  w ith and instrum ental 
in  form ulating  the  ac tio n  to  be taken by th e  B r i t is h  govern­
ment in  th is  period was David Lloyd George. An a tto rn e y , he had been 
appointed as Chancellor of the  Exchequer by Prime M in ister Asquith in  
1908. Lloyd George served in  th a t  cap ac ity  u n t i l  June of 1915 when he 
took over th e  M in istry  of M unitions, and l a t e r  he became Prime 
M in is te r of th e  wartime c o a li t io n  government. As to  h is  p e rso n a lity . 
Lord Beaverbrook s ta te s  that Lloyd George was, ”a combination of 
enormous p h y sica l a b i l i t y  jo ined  to  a m en ta lity  so voracious of 
experience and so s e n s i t iv e  to  atmosphere as to  a t ta in  to  g reatness
% avid  Lloyd Géorge, War Memoirs o f David Lloyd George (Boston, 
1933), I ,  p . 90.
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by the very v a r ie ty  and immensity of i t s  a t t r i b u t e s .”^ Haynes 
in te rp re ta t io n  of Lloyd George i s  s im ila r  to  th a t  of Lord Beaverbrook 
except th a t  i t  i s  from a negative v iew point. In h is  opinion, Lloyd 
George had no fundamental b e l ie f s  and p r in c ip le s , but was a 
compromiser.^
In Germany th e  M in istry  o f Finance during th i s  period was 
under the d ire c t io n  of Hermann Kuhn who was apparen tly  a r e la t iv e ly  
in e f fe c tiv e  m in is te r  as he i s  seldom re fe r re d  to  in  m a te ria l dealitig 
w ith  th e  period and was rep laced  w ith in  a short time a f te r  the 
outbreak of th e  war. Kuhn served in  the  cap ac ity  of M in ister of 
Finance from March of 1912 u n t i l  January 31, 191$ when he was replaced 
by Dr. Karl H e lffe r ic h .^  These two men, Hermann Kuhn and David Lloyd 
George, who held the top  governmental finance p o sitio n s  
in  the summer of l^ lh  were faced w ith  the f a s t  developing f in a n c ia l  
c r i s i s  and were expected to  take  ac tio n  to  re s to re  th e i r  co u n try 's  
f in a n c ia l  s i tu a t io n  to  a sound b a s is  in  order th a t  a system of war 
finance could be i n i t i a t e d .
On Ju ly  28, fo llow ing the break in  re la t io n s  between A u s tria -  
Hungary and S erb ia , the  volume of s e l l in g  became such th a t  the 
exchange market in  New York gave way, and from th e re  spread to  the
W illia m  Maxwell (Lord) Beaverbrook, p o l i t ic ia n s  and the War 
I9 lb-I91$ (London, i9 6 0 ), p. 76.
6john Maynard Keynes, Essays in  Biography (New York, 1933), 
pp. 32-Ul.
7per Grosse Brockhaus (L eipzig , 1931), X, p . 685.
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other fo re ig n  exchanges "and was, in  f a c t ,  the immediate cause of the 
world f in a n c ia l  c r i s i s . "8 In bo th  G reat B r ita in  and Germany during 
the l a s t  few days of Ju ly  and the f i r s t  days of August immediate 
governmental ac tio n  was necessary  in  the  sphere o f finance in  order to  
cope w ith  the c r i s i s .
In  London during  the l a s t  week of Ju ly , the c r i s i s  showed signs 
of developing in to  the  w orst crash  ever experienced in th a t  c i ty .  
S e c u r itie s  p r ic e s  d ep rec ia ted , and on F rid ay , Ju ly  31, the  London 
Stock Exchange c lo sed , a l l  o ther stock  exchanges except New York and 
the  o f f i c i a l  market in  P a r is  having closed the previous day. The 
London banks increased  the bank ra te  from 3% to  k%, then to  8% when 
they  found th a t  t h e i r  re se rv e  p o s itio n  had been se rio u s ly  weakened 
through the d e p re c ia tio n  of th e i r  own investm ents and the investm ents 
of borrowers given as s e c u rity  fo r  loans. On August I  the Governor 
of the Bank of England^ applied  to  th e  C hancellor of the Exchequer 
fo r  perm ission to  exceed the f id u c ia ry  issu e  of notes as p rescribed  
by the  Bank C harter Act of l8Wt, The re q u es t was granted by Lloyd 
George on th e  precedents of 131+7, l8$7, and 1866 when s im ila r  courses 
had been taken by the  government. At th i s  same time the bank ra te  
was ra ise d  from the new 8^ to  10^ on d iscoun ts  and advances, a
®Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, I , pp.
90-91.
^The Bank of England was p r iv a te ly  owned and d irec ted  and 
p a r tic ip a te d  in  p r iv a te  business as w ell as c e n tra l  banking. The 
Bank o f England was not a t  th is  time su b je c t to  the amount of 
governmental c o n tro l th a t  was c h a r a c te r is t ic  of th e  German Reichsbank.
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measure ’sAiich had been taken in  a l l  previous in stances when the Bank 
Act had been suspended. This increase  in  the d iscoun t r a t e ,  besides 
d iscourag ing  th e  d iscoun ting  of s e c u r i t ie s  a t  the bank, caused a 
t r a n s f e r  of c a p i ta l  to  London from o ther markets whose r a te  had 
remained unchanged, and along w ith  such a t r a n s f e r ,  the  Import of 
go ld . 30
R ea liz in g  th a t  an increase  in  th e  f id u c ia ry  issue  eased the  
s i tu a t io n  in  one d ire c t io n  only , th e  re se rv e  p o s itio n , and did nothing 
to  re l ie v e  the accep ting  houses or the s to ck  exchange, meetings fo r  
the d iscu ss io n  of p o ssib le  so lu tio n s  were held on the second and 
th i r d ,  both bank h o lidays. These m eetings re su lte d  in the drawing 
up o f a  proclam ation in  th e  evening o f August 2 g ran ting  a one- 
month moratorium to  the accep tors of b i l l s .  Besides Lloyd George, 
th is  meeting was attended by S i r  John Bradbury (permanent head of 
the tre a s u ry ) ,  o ther permanent o f f i c i a l s ,  and Lord Reading (Lord Chief 
J u s t ic e ) ,  and S ir  George P aish  (ex p ert f in a n c ia l  advisor to  the 
tre a s u ry ) .  On th e  th ird  the «Postponements of Payments A ct, l9Tli" 
which gave th e  government the power to  d ec la re  a general moratorium 
and reg u la rized  th e  process regard ing  a moratorium passed a l l  stages 
of both  h o u s e s . T h i s  a c t  was to  remain in  force fo r  a s ix -  
month p e rio d .
3^Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, I ,  pp.
91-93. 
3 ^ 5  H. C. Deb. 5 s , pp. I 8O6- I 8IO.
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From another meeting of lead ing  re p re se n ta tiv e s  of banks and 
d iscoun t houses which concluded a t  2 A. M. on Monday, the  th i r d ,  
se v e ra l re so lu tio n s  were forw arded. One re so lu tio n  was given 
immediate e f f e c t ,  i t  provided th a t  the fo u r th , f i f t h ,  and s ix th  of 
August were tDbe a d d it io n a l  bank ho lidays fo r  the fu r th e r  considera tion  
of the ra p id ly  developing f in a n c ia l  problems, Puring these th ree  
a d d itio n a l bank h o lid ay s, Lloyd George held conferences w ith 
m in is te rs , o f f i c i a l s ,  leading bankers, t r a d e r s ,  and with Austin 
Chamberlain, Chancellor of th e  Exchequer in  the preceding U nionist 
Government, This in v i ta t io n  to  an ex-C hancellor of th e  Exchequer 
of th e  opposing p a rty  was an unprecedented even t, but was designed 
to  provide th e  conferences with every a v a ila b le  person whose 
knowledge and experience could prove valuab le  in  meeting the emerging 
c r i s i s .  Following th ese  m eeting, Lloyd George announced th a t  s teps 
had been taken fo r  the  suspension of the Bank Act, as requested by 
the Governor of th e  Bank of England. He a lso  announced th a t  th e re  
would be no suspension of specie  payment, and was la te r  to  s ta te  
th a t  t h i s  ac tio n  providing fo r  th e  continuance of specie  payment 
" g re a tly  helped us to  recover f in a n c ia l  norm ality , because i t  tended 
toward r e s to ra t io n  of confidence which was so v i t a l ly  necessary a t  
the moment." Lloyd George a lso  appealed along p a t r io t ic  grounds fo r  
the  p ub lic  to  r e f r a in  from attem pting to  hoard gold , and he 
accented the  g re a t p a r t  th a t  finance was to  play in  the  ensuing
s tru g g le .Ï2
^%jloyd George, Mar Memoirs of David Lloyd George, I ,  pp. 91+-96.
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Following these  d e c is io n s , the government took up the currency 
problem, a problem which developed because the  public  could not be 
induced to  accep t £5 Bank of England notes which were not represen ted  
by £5 of gold . Also because of th e  suddenly increased business 
a c t iv i ty  and varied  p ric e  r i s e s ,  a need fo r  more currency and fo r  
sm aller denominations d e v e lo p e d .^  The government decided upon the 
issuance of th re e  m illio n  pounds of £ l  and 10s notes which would 
be convertab le  a t  th e  Bank of England, and which were to  ready a t  
the end of the ho lid ay s. These notes were to  be av a ilab le  a t  the 
r a te  of f iv e  m illio n  pounds per day u n t i l  th ere  was a s u f f ic ie n t  supply. 
Governmental a c tio n  made p o s ta l  money orders tem porarily  le g a l tender 
during th is  period of currency sho rtage . On the s ix th , the Currency 
and Bank Note B i l l  which leg a liz e d  th i s  issuance of new currency and 
n o tes , and which suspended the Bank Act passed a l l  stages in  both 
h o u s e s . ïb Lloyd George a lso  took ac tio n  reducing the newly imposed 
bank r a te  from 10^ to  6% s ta t in g  th a t  th i s  ac tio n  reducing the  bank 
r a te  would tend to  rea ssu re  th e  business community as a sign of the 
s tre n g th  of the  Bank of E n g lan d .^
%^Henry F. Grady, B r i t is h  War Finance 19^-19X9 (New York, 
1927), p . Til.
H. G. Deb. 9 s , pp. 2101-210?.
^L loyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, I ,  p . 97.
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Also , on August 6 , th e  F i r s t  G eneral Proclam ation which 
extended the  moratorium u n t i l  September I4 on b i l l s  of axchat^e, 
nego tiab le  instrum ents, and co n tra c ts  o th er than those fo r  wage pay­
ments was an n o u n ced .^  Less than  a week l a t e r ,  a means was approved 
whereby th e  Bank of England, under government guaran tee, s e t  about to  
d iscoun t b i l l s  of exchange drawn before August and to  re lie v e
the  holders of these b i l l s  of a l l  l i a b i l i t y .
Thus did the B r i t is h  governimnt a c t to  curb the f in a n c ia l  
chaos which was developing during th e  diplom atic c r i s i s  preceding 
the  a c tu a l  outbreak of war. The ac tio n s  which were decided upon 
by c o n su lta tio n  among the o f f i c i a l s  of the f in a n c ia l  in s t i tu t io n s ,  
government o f f i c i a l s ,  and p o l i t i c a l  leaders  were quickly  in s t i tu te d  
and were su ccessfu l in  curbing the f in a n c ia l  c r i s i s .
* * *
Even though Germany did have a th e o re t ic a l ly  operative plan 
fo r  f in a n c ia l  m ob iliza tion  from th e  moment of the d ec la ra tio n  of 
war, through the t h i r t y  days o f the m obiliza tion  period or to  the 
f i r s t  d ec is iv e  b a t t l e ,  she experienced much the same public re ac tio n  
th a t  England experienced during the c r i t i c a l  diplom atic period .
There was panic on th e  s to ck  exchange, a panic beginning on Ju ly  23 
and continuing  u n t i l  the c lo sin g  of th e  exchange on the tw enty-n in th . 
There was a run  on the banks fo r  the conversion of notes to  gold, a
H. C. Deb, ^s p. 2103.
^H u rw itz , S ta te  In te rv en tio n  in  G reat B r ita in , p . 67 .
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w ithdraw al o f savings from savings accounts and a hoarding of money, 
a l l  of which prompted the Reiehsbank to  give no tice  th a t  a f te r  Ju ly  31 
i t  would no longer redeem i t s  notes in  gold.%^
The German f in a n c ia l  m o b iliza tio n  plan had re su lte d  from the 
ev iden t s t r a in  on the  monetary and c r e d i t  system in  1?05 during the 
Morocco c r i s i s .  This in c id en t had prompted a considera tion  and 
im provisation  of measures concerned w ith  a fu tu re  f in a n c ia l  m obiliza­
t io n  f o r  war. The f i r s t  a c tio n  was th e  in tro d u c tio n  in 1906 of low 
value bank notes to  take th e  place of gold coin so th a t  th is  gold 
could be pu t in to  re se rv e . In 1909 the Reichsbank c h a r te r  came up 
fo r  renew al. P rov ision  was made in  A r tic le  3 req u irin g  jo in t  stock  
banks to  increase  th e i r  bank d ep o s it in  the Reichsbank and to  publish  
a bi-m onthly balance sh e e t.^ ^  In 1910 S ecre tary  o f S ta te  Wermuth 
placed before th e  Emperor a s e r ie s  o f f in a n c ia l  measures to  be taken 
by th e  government so as to  increase  th e  gold reserv e  of the  Reichsbank 
and p ro te c t i t s  gold supply in  the event of war. These measures 
would prov ide , should war break o u t, fo r  th e  increase  of tre a su ry  
notes by 100$, the use of tre a su ry  b i l l s  as bankable paper money 
s e c u r i t ie s ,  and th e  estab lishm ent of s p e c ia l  c r e d i t  o ff ic e s  to  re lie v e
'^ B o g art, D irec t and In d ire c t Costs of the  War, p . 198,
^ L ,  Bendlx, «Germany's F in a n c ia l M obiliza tion ,"  Q uarterly  
Jo u rn a l of Economics, XXIX ( l9 l^ ) ,  pp. 721-727.
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the  Reichsbank of p a r t  of i t s  ta sk  as a c re d it  g ran ting  institu tion .^*^
A ll of these  measures were to  cover the f in a n c ia l  needs of the period
of m o b iliza tio n  only. I t  had been a n tic ip a te d  th a t  follow ing the
m o b iliza tio n  period and the f i r s t  d ec is iv e  b a t t l e ,  German and fo re ign
c a p i ta l  would reg a in  such confidence in the  u ltim ate  German success
th a t  i t  would be placed a t  th e  d isp o sa l of the German tre a su ry  a t  a
reasonable r a te  of i n t e r e s t .21
On August 1 , the  decree fo r  the  m obiliza tion  of the German
armed fo rce s  was issu ed , and the  p lan  fo r  f in a n c ia l  m obilization  was
put in to  e f f e c t .  The Im perial war tre a su ry  co n sis tin g  of 120 m illio n
marks in  gold from th e  French indemnity of I87I  and an a d d itio n a l 85
m illio n  marks in  gold ra ise d  through the a c t  of July  3 , T9T3, was
tra n s fe rre d  to  th e  Reichsbank in  order to  increase  the specie balance.
Short term  c r e d i t  was granted by th e  Reichsbank to  finance the
m o b iliza tio n  of th e  land and sea fo rc e s . Another measure provided fo r
th e  g ran ting  of ex tensive c r e d i t  to  economic and commercial c i r c le s
through the c e n tra l  bank of is su e , and ye t another provided fo r
ex tensive loans on s to c k s , b i l l s ,  and s e c u r i t ie s .  These loans were to
be granted by loan o ff ic e s  (Darlhenkassen) which were to  be opened in 
a l l  of the  la rg e r  c i t i e s  of the E m p i r e . 22
20rhe Reichsbank while p r iv a te ly  owned was managed by appointees 
o f the Emperor and performed a c e n tr a l  bank fu n ctio n  through providing 
f a c i l i t i e s  f o r  th e  whole empire and ac ting  as  banker to  th e  empire and 
the  s ta te s  f re e  of charge.
p . U7.
21kendelssohn Bart hold y, The War and German Society, pp. 6U-67. 
^^General Erich Ludendorff, The Nation at War (London, 1936),
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On August th e  fo llow ing m ob iliza tion  laws were adopted:
Law UUt8 which made Im perial Treasury notes le g a l tender and suspended 
specie  payment fo r  both these and fo r  the Reichsbank notes; Law kh3^ 
which abolished  the ta x  on a l l  note c irc u la t io n  in  excess of 550, 000, 
000 marks over and above the gold coverage and empowered the Reichsbank 
to  include three-m onth tre a su ry  b i l l s  of the Reich in  i t s  note 
coverage; Law hUU6 which organized th e  Loan Banks which had previously  
appeared in  P ru ss ia  in  iShS and in  the Franco-Prussian War of I 87I ;  
and Law hUlU which provided th a t  su b s id ia ry  and minor coins were no 
longer exchangeable fo r  g o ld .23
Gemiany, unlike G reat B r i ta in ,  did not d ec la re  a moratorium, 
and i t  was the boast of f in a n c ie rs  th a t  she had so perfected  her c re d it  
mechanism th a t  she did not have to  r e s o r t  to  a moratorium. Even 
though a le g a l moratorium did not e x i s t ,  a defacto  moratorium did 
e x i s t .  The abrogation  of p r iv a te  co n tra c ts  fo r payment in  gold which 
had been entered  in to  p r io r  to  Ju ly  1, 19lU was authorized by the 
government, and by the e d ic t  of the BundeSrat on August 6, %he 
payment o f b i l l s  and checks was extended fo r  30 days, and mortgages 
were postponed u n t i l  the end of th e  war.^b
Ih meeting th e  problems p re c ip ita te d  by the th re a t  of war and 
made accute by the deepening war c r i s i s ,  both co u n trie s  had been 
forced  to  tak e  a c tio n . Besides upse ttin g  the  in te rn a tio n a l f in a n c ia l
^^Bendix, Loc. G it. , pp. 728-32.
Zbgogart, D irec t and In d ire c t Costs of th e  War, p. 201.
28
s t r a c tu r e ,  th e  th r e a t  of war had upset the  in te rn a l  f in a n c ia l  
s tr u c tu re .  On th e  s tock  market the  p o s itio n  of domestic as Well aâ 
fo re ig n  investm ents had been weakened. This s itu a t io n  brought about 
a temporary c lo sing  of the exchanges, a run  on th e  banks, and e ith e r  
a temporary c lo sin g  of the banks or a suspension of specie  payment. 
In  th e  comparison o f the measures taken by the governments df 
Great B r i ta in  and Germany in  coping w ith  th is  f in a n c ia l  c r i s i s ,  one 
notes only one s ig n if ic a n t  d if fe re n c e . I t  is  the  governmental 
a t t i tu d e  toward sp ec ie  payment. G reat B r ita in  viewed specie payment 
as a way of assu ring  the pub lic  of the s ta b i l iz a t io n  of finance, 
Germany took th e  viewpoint th a t  a stro n g  gold reserv e  was th e  key to  
f in a n c ia l  s ta b i l i z a t io n .  In a l l  o ther problems dealing  with th e  
i n i t i a l  f in a n c ia l  c r i s i s ,  th e  a c tio n  tak en , i f  not the same, had a 
s im ila r  e f f e c t  in  the s ta b i l iz a t io n  of the in te rn a l  f in a n c ia l  
s t r u c tu r e ,
cmPTER H I
THE FIRST WAR YEAR
Immediately upon com pleting the necessary enactments fo r  the
s ta b i l i z a t io n  of the f in a n c ia l  s i tu a t io n .  Great B r ita in  and Germany
turned to  the problems involved in  the  financing  of the war period .
Lloyd George, an advocate fo r  th e  covering of as much of th e  war
expenditu res as  p o ssib le  by ta x a tio n ,^  voiced the  fe e lin g s  dominant
w ith in  th e  B r i t i s h  m ajo rity  p a rty  in  h is  budget speech before the
House o f Commons on November 17 , 171Î;:
I  a lso  p o in t th i s  o u t, th a t  had Mr. P i t t  not s e t  th a t  noble 
and heroic example, and had i t  not been followed by h is 
successo rs , we should today have been devoting the proceeds 
of a fourpenny Income Tax to  pay in te r e s t  in  re sp ec t of money 
which he found out of ta x a t io n , which otherw ise would have 
been borrowed and been added to  th e  N ational Debt,
D r. K arl H e lffe r ic h , a t  t h i s  tim e D irec to r of the  Deutsche Bank in
B e r lin , voiced th e  dominant p r in c ip le  behind Germany’s f in a n c ia l
p o licy  during th e  F i r s t  World War. That i s ,  th a t  Germany’s enemies
should pay f o r  th e  whole co s t of the war a f te r  th e i r  d e fe a t,  and a l l
of th e  m ili ta ry  expenses, to  include th e  sum spent fo r  peacetime
maintenance of the army, be placed in  an ”ex trao rd in ary  budget"
covered by loans and tre a su ry  b i l l s  to  be redeemed out o f rep a ra tio n s
% loyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, I ,  p . 1p8. 
^68 H. 0. Deb, g s , p . 352.
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payments a t  w ar’s end .3 In viewing th e  approaches of these two 
cd u n trie s  i t  i s  im portant to  remember th a t  a t  th is  time n e ith e r  
government a n tic ip a te d  a war la s t in g  more than s ix  months.
m  G feat B r ita in  on August 6, th e  f i r s t  war c re d i ts  b i l l  
was considered in  committee and agreed to  w ithout d isse n tio n , and on 
the e ig h th  was agreed to  w ithout amendment bjr th e  House of Lords. The 
b i l l  granted  £100,000,000 to  be used fo r  defraying  expenses which i t  
was f e l t  would be incurred  during  the year ending March 31, 191S.^
I t  was a t  t h i s  tim e th a t  the  government and the  country were faced 
w ith  the issue  of whether th e  la rg e  sum needed i f  the  war were to  
continue f a r  in to  1915 should be obtained e n t i r e ly  by loans and added 
to  th e  n a tio n a l d e b t, or whether th e  sum should be paid fo r  so f a r  
as p o ssib le  by c u rre n t ta x a tio n , ’’and thus reduce the debt burden to  
be handed on to  the next g e n e ra tio n ,”^ In the  debate on th i s  f i r s t  
war c r e d i t  b i l l  the only t o t a l  opposition  was from S ir W ilfred Lawson, 
member from Cumberland, Cockermouth, who h e s ita te d  a t  a “Vote of 
C red it f o r  a war in  Europe w ith  which we have no d i r e c t  concern."^
^Klaus E p s te in , M atthias Erzberger and th e  Dilemma of German 
Democracy (P rin ce to n , 1959), p . 33T.
^Both governments operated th e i r  financing  on a f i s c a l  year 
beginning A p ril 1 and ending March 31*
% loyd George, War Memoirs o f David Lloyd George, I ,  p. 106. 
^65 H. G. Deb. 5 s , p . 2095.
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On November l6 ,  191U» the motion fo r  a second vote of c re d it  was 
in troduced  and considered by th e  House of Commons in  Committee. The 
B r i t is h  government found th a t  the c o s ts  of war were much higher than 
a n tic ip a te d , but they  had not y e t  re v ise d  th e i r  b e l ie f  in  a sh o rt war. 
This supplementary war c r e d i t  fo r the remainder of the f i s c a l  year 
ending March 31, 1915 was not to  exceedJ^225,000,000 and was to  be 
used fo r  the
. . .  conduct of Naval and M ilita ry  o p e ra tio n s , fo r  a s s is t in g  the
Food Supply, and promoting the Continuance of Trade, Industry , 
Business and Communications, whether by means of insurance or 
indem nity a g a in s t r i s k ,  the financing  of the purchase and 
re s a le  of fo o d stu ffs  and m a te r ia ls , or o therw ise, fo r R e lie f  of 
D is tre s s ,  and g en era lly  fo r  a l l  expenses a r is in g  out of the 
ex is ten ce  of a s ta te  of w ar.?
On the next day, November 17, Lloyd George, Chancellor o f 
the Exchequer, in troduced in to  committee the f i r s t  war budget. This 
war budget a n tic ip a te d  ad d itio n a l ta x a tio n  through a doubling of the 
income ta x  from 1 s h i l l in g  U pence to  2 s h il l in g s  8 pence on the 
pound, a doubling o f the su p ertax , a r a i s i r ^  of the beer duty from 
?s 9d p er b a r re l  to  25s p er b a r r e l ,  and an increase  of the te a  duty 
from 5d to  8d per pound.^ Following Lloyd George's in tro d u c tio n  of 
the budget, Mr. Geofrey C o llin s , member from Greenock, s ta te d  th a t  the 
country would no t s u f f ic ie n t ly  ap p rec ia te  the economic e f fe c ts  of the
war "unless ta x a tio n  i s  ra is e d  and each man fe e ls  i t  in  h is  own
9
pocket,"  And Mr. David Mason, member from Coventry, s ta te d  a few
?68 H. C. Deb. 5 s , p . 256.
^Lloyd George, War Memoirs o f David Lloyd George, I ,  p . 106,
9
H irs t and A llen , B r it ish  War Budgets, p . 53.
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days e a r l i e r :
No one f o r  a moment would suggest th a t  t h i s  War can bd ca rried  
on by ta x a tio n , or even la rg e ly  by ta x a tio n , because Of i t s  
enormous c o s t,  but i f  you have a c e r ta in  p roportion  of War 
su p p lies  derived  from ta x a tio n , you would bring  before the 
people the f a c t  of what War i s ,  what the expenses a re , and 
th i s  would tend , in  the  nature  of th in g s , to  d ire c t  men's 
minds, as soon and as ex p ed itio u sly  as p o ss ib le , t o  the 
p o s s ib i l i ty  of b ring ing  about an honourable peace,’ ®
The p re v a ilin g  govertunent view on ta x a tio n  and borrowing was voiced
by Lloyd George in  h is  budget address before the House of Commons.
I f  Is  obviously out o f the  q uestion  to  r a is e  th e  whole of th is  
sum ( £ii50,000,000) of money by t a x a t i o n . . . I f  we do not tax  
and ta x  h eav ily , i t  w i l l  be a se rio u s  departu re  fo r  the f i r s t  
time from the  honoured t r a d i t io n s  s e t  and h ith e r to  maintained 
by th i s  j^ u n try  in  every s in g le  in  which i t  has ever been 
en g a g e d .^
And w hile expressing  no opinion as to  the exact leng th  of the  war, he
took th e  viewpoint of a longer war, p o ssib ly  s ix  months, when
presen tin g  h is  budget:
We a re  f ig h tin g  a tough enemy. We are f ig h tin g  an enemy th a t  
cannot submit to  any terms we can a c c e p t . . .  w ithout a smashing 
d e f e a t . . . .  Therefore i f  th e re  is  any doubt about the  leng th  of 
th e  War, I  am bound, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, to  
assume a longer period r a th e r  than a sh o rte r  period in  making
ray p lans,
Following th e  th ird  reading on November 26, 191H, the Finance B i l l  
was passed and war ta x a tio n  in  G reat B r i ta in  was a r e a l i t y . ^
H. G. Deb. 5 s , pp. 55-56, 
T-^lbid., p . 350.
^ ^ Ib id .,  p . 353.
^ Ib id . ,  p . %6L.
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Also during November, in  accordance w ith  the war loans b i l l  
which had been passed August 28, 19lU, Lloyd George announced the 
issuance of the f i r s t  war loan* The war loan  b i l l  had d iffe re d  from 
a l l  previous war loan  b i l l s  in  th a t  the a c tu a l amount to  be o ffe red  
had n o t been in s e r te d , and the method to  be used in  ra is in g  the 
money had n o t been s p e c if ie d . N either had a date been designated fo r 
the issuance of the lo a n , a  fa c to r  which enabled the government to 
s e t  the is su e  date in  o rder to  take  the b e s t advantage o f market 
c o n d i t i o n s , T h i s  lo an , a 3%$ s e c u r ity  w ith  a face value of 
^  350,000,000 was issu ed  a t  9$ and was to be redeemable a t  par in  
the period  1925- 1926, This loan  was qu ick ly  oversubscribed and 
y ie ld e d ^ 332,500,000.^^
In May, 1915, Lloyd George, s h o r t ly  before vacating the o ffic e  
o f Chancellor o f the Exchequer, p resen ted  h is  second war budget in  
which no new fe a tu re s  o r m odifica tions of tax a tio n  were advanced, 
Lloyd George in  h is  memoirs gave two reasons fo r t h i s .  F i r s t ly ,  the 
a d d itio n a l taxes imposed by the November I9lU budget were only 
beginning to  produce, and w hile he agreed th a t  ad d itions to  tax a tio n  
would be n ecessary , he advocated w aiting  u n t i l  autumn for a decision  
as to  what they  should be. Secondly, the only a d d itio n a l tax a tio n  he 
was w illin g  to  i n i t i a t e  in  May fo r  immediate implementation was a tax  
on a lco h o lic  l iq u o rs .  He f e l t  th a t  the opposition  to  be encountered
% 6  H. c .  Deb, 5s pp. 5U-55,
l^Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, I ,  p . 109,
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a t  th a t  tima made i t  Im possible to  in troduce such a ta x  w ithout
r a is in g  a “most v io le n t and undesirab le  p o l i t i c a l  c o n tro v e rs y ." ^
By June 21, 1915, when the  second war loan was issu ed , Lloyd
George had accepted the  p o s itio n  of M in is te r of Munitions and Reginald 
¥
McKenna, a s e l f  a s se r t iv e  man with s tre n g th  of opinion and co n v ic tio n , 
had rep laced  him as C hancellor of the Exchequer. Lord Beaverbrook in  
h i s  ev a lu a tio n  of McKenna s ta te s  " th a t  the more Mclfenna in fu r ia te s  you 
by h is  in te l l e c tu a l  d e c is io n , th e  more you f e e l  drawn towards him 
p e rso n a lly ."17 The second war lo an , issued sh o rtly  a f t e r  McKenna took 
o f f ic e ,  was issued w ith  an c^per l im it  of £910,000,000 and consisted  
o f bonds issued a t  p a r. The l i s t  f o r  the loans was closed Ju ly  
10, and th e  loan yielded  £570,000,000 in  new money and a Conversion 
o f government s e c u r i t ie s  in  the amount of £276,500,000.^® The 
increase  in  th e  in te r e s t  r a te  on th is  loan  over th e  in te re s t  r a te  on 
the previous loan prompted severe c r i t ic is m  from Lloyd George who 
thought th e  in crease  unnecessary because th e  expansion in nominal 
c a p i ta l  reso u rces  due to  in f la t io n  and th e  r e s t r i c t io n  of an overseas 
market f o r  investee nt money made i t  p o ss ib le  fo r  the government to  
ob ta in  th e  money i t  requ ired  by vo lun tary  investm ent w ithout ra is in g  
th e  in te r e s t  r a t e .  He advocated th a t  in v esto rs  would have had to  
accep t t h i s  r a t e  f o r  lack  of an a l te r n a t iv e ,  and i f  they were
^ I b i d . ,  p . 105.
T^Beaverbrook, P o l i t ic ia n s  and the War, p . Iii9.
% lo y d  George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George, I ,  p . 110,
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unw illing  to  do t h i s ,  « there would be c le a r  and popular ground fo r  
the co n sc rip tio n  of c a p i ta l  f o r  war p u rp o se s .* ^
In  G reat B r ita in  a t  th e  end o f th e  f i r s t  year of war th e  amount 
o f ta x a tio n  a c tu a lly  paid in to  the Exchequer was £23^,000,000. This 
can be conpared w ith  £193,000,000 fo r  th e  peace year immediately 
preceeding ,20  and in  th i s  co n tex t shows th a t  an e f f o r t  was being made 
by the  government to  increase  th e  ta x  revenue. Even though th is  
in c re a æ  in  ta x  revenue was sm all, i t  c o n tra s ts  w ith  the s ta tu s  quo 
German ta x  program fo r  th e  f i r s t  war year.
*  * *
During th e  f i r s t  months a f t e r  th e  outbreak of the  war, Germany 
pursued a f in a n c ia l  course s im ila r  to  th a t  of G reat B r ita in . On 
August li, the  H eichstag  approved th e  war c re d its  asked fo r  by the  
government.21 jn  September, the f i r s t  war loan was issued and over­
subscribed , According to  Dr. Karl H e lffe r ic h , D irec to r of the 
Deutsche Bank in B e rlin , th e  funds ra ise d  by th is  loan « re liev es  our 
government fo r  a period th a t  extends w ell in to  next year, of any 
anx ie ty  concerning th e  p rocu ra tion  of the money requ ired  fo r  the con­
tin u a tio n  of the  w a r . ”22 This proved to  be an overestim ation , fo r  in
^ ^ Ib id . ,  p . 110.
20 ,Stanç», Taxation During the  War, p.
21philip Scheidemann, Memoirs of a Social Democrat, tr . by J .  E. 
Miche 11 (London, 1929), I ,  p. 276.
^ % r. K arl H e lffe r ic h , The German War loan (B e rlin , 19 llt), p. 8,
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Germany, as in  G reat B r i ta in ,  the  government found th a t  d a ily  war 
expenditures f a r  exceeded th e  es tim a tio n . Because of th is  u n d e re s ti­
mation o f expenditures which was due to  th e  complete lack  of knowledge 
o f th e  f in a n c ia l  demands of a t o t a l  war, Germany found i t  necessary to  
o f fe r  new bond is su e s  in  March and again in  September o f 191$. Both 
is su e s  were oversubscribed .
While th e  war c re d its  were alm ost unanimously approved in  the  
R eichstag on August It, 19lU, o pposition  to  the  approval of fu r th e r  
war c re d i ts  s te a d ily  grew, p a r t ic u la r ly  among the S o c ia l is ts .  P h ilip  
Scheidemann s ta te s  th a t  in  e a r ly  August the  c iv i l ia n  population hâd 
been le d  to  b e lie v e  th a t  Germany had been a ttack ed , th a t  th e  French 
had poisoned German w ater su p p lie s , and th a t  French airmen had 
dropped bombs on Nuremberg and F u rth . A ll had been convinced, says 
Scheidemann, th a t  throughout the  d ip lom atic c r i s i s  Germany had done
p-j
her b e s t  to  prevent war. Whereas th e  opposition  to  th e  war c re d its
b i l l  in  August I 91U had numbered l l i ,  th e  opposition  climbed to  17 in
th e  Decaiiber war c re d i ts  v o te . In  March 1915 th e  opposition numbered
25, in creased  to  36 in  August, and rose  to  k3 in  th e  Decanber 1915 vote.
This in c rease  in  opposition  throughout 1915 was no t only due to  the
s o c ia l i s t  opposition  to  the  an n ex a tio n is t p o licy , bu t a lso  due to  the
in c re a s in g  p re ss  e a iso rsh ip , th e  in c rea s in g  th re a t  o f a r r e s t ,  th e  ever
in c re a s in g  food problems, and th e  u n s a tis fa c to ry  r e l i e f  being provided 
2k
s o ld ie rs  w ives. Of those  approving war c r e d i ts ,  many approved the
^^Scheidemann, Memoirs o f a  S ocia l Democrat, I ,  p. 203. 
^ I b i d . , p . 276.
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an n ex a tio n is t and indemnity p o lic y , o th e rs  perhaps ra tio n a liz e d  as did 
Scheidemann in  th e  December 19lU v o te , th a t  i t  would he e a s ie r  fo r  th e  
S o c ia l is ts  on th e  s tre n g th  of t h e i r  conduct during the war to  ge t what
gd
they  had found im possible b e fo re  th e  war.
In  February 191$, Dr. Karl H e lffe riq h , a w ell educated man who
had been a u n iv e rs i ty  l e c tu r e r ,  a railw ay d ire c to r ,  and a bank d i r -
26e c to r , was appointed to  th e  M in is try  of F inance. In h is  speech
before  th e  R eichstag  on March 10 , 191$, H e lffe rich  gave expression
to  h is  b e l ie f s  regard ing  governmental war finance saying th a t :
The means o f f in an c in g  a modern war are  s u b s ta n tia l ly  the  
f o l lo ^ n g :  F i r s t ,  th e  is su e  o f lo a n s j second, the use of
th e  p r in t in g  p ress  fo r  th e  is su e  o f notes and paper money? 
th i r d ,  a  reduction  o f expenses and war t a x a t i o n . ^7
He a lso  s ta te d  to  th e  R eichstag  e a r ly  in  191$ th a t ,  "We do not d e s ire
to  in c re a se  by ta x a tio n  th e  heavy burden which war c a s ts  upon our
go
peop le ."  And in  th e  sp rin g  o f 191$ when the  co s t and unpred icatab le  
le n g th  o f th e  war ought to  have become apparen t. Dr. H elfferich  s t i l l  
f a i le d  to  in troduce  new tax es . According to  Epstein in  h is  biography 
of M atthias E rzberger, th is  f a i lu r e  was due to  a continued f a i th  in  
an e a rly  v ic to ry , th e  u n d e s ira b il i ty  o f c o n tro v e rs ia l le g is la t io n  in  
th e  m idst o f war, and the  p o l i t i c a l  d i f f i c u l t i e s  due to  the  f e d e ra l i s t
^^ Ib id . , p . 2U6,
2^Per Grosse Brockhaus, 7 I I I ,  p. 362.
27cited  in  Bogart, D irec t and In d ire c t  Costs of th e  War, p . 209.
^®Cited in  Alexander Dana Noyes, F in an c ia l Chapters of th e  War 
(New York, 1917), p . 6?.
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l im ita t io n s  on Germany's n a tio n a l f in a n c e .29
Following the f in a n c ia l  s ta b i l iz a t io n  of the e a r ly  war period , 
th e  governments o f both c o u n tr ie s  turned to  the  problem of obtaining 
immediate funds fo r  the f in an c in g  of th e  i n i t i a l  war period . Again 
both co u n trie s  followed a s im ila r  cou rse , the  Parliam entary  approval 
of war c r e d i t s .  During the f i r s t  year of th e  war, Germany did not 
s tra y  from her announced course of war f in an ce , borrowing. G reat 
B r i ta in ,  however, embarked on a f in a n c ia l  program which involved both 
borrowing and ta x a tio n . Her i n i t i a l  ta x  program, even though moderate, 
was introduced w ith in  a few months a f t e r  the  outbreak of the war.
Both co u n trie s  encouraged th e  pu b lic  to  in v est av a ilab le  
investm ent money in  loans to  the government and thus th e  government 
was not only ab le  to  ob ta in  th is  money fo r  war fin an ce , but was able 
to  d ra in  o ff  excess money and curb in f la t io n a ry  tendencies . In the 
f ie ld  of governmental war f in a n c e , the governments of both nations 
had been su ccessfu l in  the f i r s t  year of th e  war.
Z^Epstein, M atthias E rzberger, p . 331.
cmPTEg 17 
WAR FUîMCE 1915-1918
]h G reat B r ita in  la  the f a l l  of 1915, a ta x  program much more 
comprehensive than th a t  embodied in  the  F i r s t  War Budget was presented 
to  the House of Commons fo r  approval. While Lloyd George had taken 
th e  f i r s t  s te p s  towards a program of ta x a tio n  fo r  the war e f f o r t ,  
McKenna p u t in to  e f f e c t  the f i r s t  r e a l i s t i c  ta x  program, McKenna’S 
ta x  program took in to  account the  r is in g  co s ts  of the war, the 
in creasin g  incomes of the  pub lic  and of b u s in ess , and the  general 
w illin g n ess  of th e  pub lic  to  be taxed .
The Second War Budget was presented by McKenna to  the House of 
Commons in  Committee on September 21, 1915, ^ and was debated upon 
u n t i l  December 9, I9%5, when i t  was passed a f t e r  th e  th ird  reading .
T he most s ig n if ic a n t  p rov isions o f th is  budget were the  standard 
income ta x  in c rea se , from 2s 6d to  3s 6d on the pound, and the 
red u c tio n  of th e  minimum income exemption from £ l6 0  to  £130, This 
red u c tio n  in  th e  exemption extended the ta x  base by the  in c lu sio n  of 
numerous weekly wage earners  as  tax p ay ers. Since these  weekly wage 
earn ers  were l ik e ly  to  experience d i f f i c u l ty  and hardship from a 
system of y early  assessm ent and c o l le c t io n ,  a system of q u a rte rly  
assessm ent and c o lle c t io n  was in troduced . In ad d itio n  to  these changes
h k  H. G. Deb. 5 s . p . 3k7. 
h S  H. C. Deb. 5 s , p . 1653.
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in  the  s tandard  income ta x , a graduated supertax  was p laced  on incomes
o f over j[2 ,000 . In  th i s  budget program McKenna a lso  e s ta b lish e d  an
excess p r o f i t s  ta x ,  the r a te  to  be o f th e  p r o f i t s  in  excess of
the  normal average p r o f i t  fo r  the th re e  years preceding the war. In
the area  o f  customs and excise  tax e s , the  new program provided fo r  an
ad valorem duty o f 33 1/3% o f  c lo ck s , w atches, m usical instrum ents,
p la te  g la s s ,  and h a ts .  The duty on sugar was increased  from I s  lOd p er
hundred w eight to  9s Ld p e r hundred w eight, and the  d u tie s  on motor
fu e l ,  p a te n t m edicines, te a ,  cocoa, c o ffe e , ch ico iy , d ried  f r u i t s ,  and
3tobacco were doubled.
Upon the  passage of th is  program, Mr. Tim Healy, member of 
Parliam ent from Cork, N orth-E ast, i s  rep o rted  to  have congratu lated  
the C hancellor o f  th e  Exchequer s ta t in g  th a t  the Chancellor "would 
have the s a t i s f a c t io n  o f showing to  th e  enemy a p r a c t ic a l ly  unanimous 
House in  th e  face  o f in creased  ta x a tio n  o f an enomous amount.
Even though th i s  budget provided fo r  a tremendous in crease  in  
ta x a tio n , th e re  were some who thought th a t  even h igher ta x a tio n  was 
ad v isa b le . The S p ec ta to r, according to  Stamp, s ta te d  th a t  the  budget 
showed "g re a t courage", and th a t  even "bolder p roposals" should have 
been prom oted.^ Punch c a rr ie d  an a r t i c l e  which commented, "'L loyd
^ H irs t and A lien , B r i t is h  War Budgets, pp. 8 l-8 ^ . 
^Staitç), Taxation During the  War, p . ^2,
^ I b id . ,  p . 52.
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George ch as tised  the taxpayers w ith  whips — McKenna lays on w ith
6scorpions and y e t no murmur i s  heard.
In  th e  A p ril,  1916 budget the income ta x  r a te  was again ra is e d , 
and the maximum r a te  was increased from 3s 6d to  5s on the pound. The
ta x  r a te  on excess p r o f i ts  was upped from $0% to  60^ and the taxes on
amusements, su g ar, cocoa, co ffe e , ch ico ry , matches, and railw ay 
t ic k e ts  costii%  over 9d were a lso  in c reased .?
I t  was during  th i s  p e rio d , m id-1916, th a t  many B r it ish e rs  were
beginning to  d isc u ss  and consider the  p o s s ib i l i ty  of an indemnity 
p ro v is io n  to  be included in  'ttie peace se ttlem en t. S ir  Jo siah  Stanç 
re p o rts  th a t  th i s  d iscu ss io n  of indem nities to  be lev ied  by the A llie s  
was becoming more freq u en t because of th e  boasting  by the  German 
C hancellor of a Genman peace se ttle m e n t which would impose enormous
Q
indem nities on th e  d efea ted ,
A change in  th e  government occurred on December 5 , 19 l6 , when 
Mr. A squith resigned  as Prime M in is te r. A c o a li t io n  government was 
formed under Lloyd George, and in  th is  new government Mr. Bonar Law, 
a su c c e ss fu l and capable businessman and p o l i t i c ia n ,  was given the 
p o s itio n  of C hancellor of the Exchequer. Lord Beaverbrook says of 
Bonar Law, th a t  he "always had a s trong  s tre a k  of melancholy in  h is
As quoted in  Stanç», Taxation During the War,  p. 52. 
? Ib ld . ,  pp. 88-89.
® IM d„ p . 90.
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d is p o s i t io n . At th e  h e s t of tim es he was never exuberantly  gay ."
The 1917 and 1918 budgets which were introduced by Bonar Law 
provided fo r  few changes in  th e  B r i t i s h  ta x  po licy  over those of the 
previous year. The no tab le  changes in  ta x a tio n  as presented in  the
1917 budget were th e  increase in  th e  excess p r o f i t s  ta x  from to  
8C$, and th e  in crease  in  the tax es  on tobacco and amusements.^® The
1918 budget a lso  provided fo r  a  few in creases  in  e x is te n t  tax e s , the
su pertax  on incomes over £2,J?00 was increased to  Us 6d on the pound,
the beer duty per b a r r e l  was doubled, and th e  income ta x , s p i r i t  du ty ,
11tobacco ta x ,  luxury ta x ,  sugar ta x ,  and match duty were ra ised ..-
m  January , 3PI7, th e  th i r d  and l a s t  fixed  su b sc rip tio n  period 
B r i t is h  war loan was issu ed . This loan consis ted  o f two forms of 
bonds, a k% ta x  f re e  bond issued  a t  p a r , maturing 1929-19U2, and a 
tax ab le  bond issued  a t  9$, and m aturing from 1929-19U7. This loan 
y ie lded  more than  £1,000,000,000 in  new money, and the  conversion of 
e a r l i e r  s e c u r i t ie s  in  th e  amount of £1^-100,000,000, October,
1917, a  system fo r  th e  continuous sa le  of “N ational War Bonds” was 
i n i t i a t e d .  These bonds were convertab le  and were acceptable in  
payment of death  d u tie s  and excess p r o f i t s  t a x e s ,^
O
Beaverbrook, P o l i t ic ia n s  and the War, p . 2$U. 
^®Stamp, Taxation During the War, pp. 109-110. 
^^ Ib id . , pp. 12U-126.
^ G ra d y , B r i t is h  War Finance l9lU *19l9, p . 133. 
^ I b i d . ,  p . 136.
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■While m id-19l5 had evidenced in  G reat B r ita in  th e  in tro d u c tio n  of 
s ig n if ic a n t  changes in  ta x  p o lic y , no change occurred in  the German tax a -  
p o licy  u n t i l  th e  sp rin g  o f  1916. %  the sp rin g  o f 1916, the  lagging rev­
enue to  cover th e  o rd inary  budget, and the  p ressu re  from pub lic  opinion and 
from th e  s o c ia l i s t s  as expressed in  the  re ic h s ta g  fo rced  Dr, H e lfe rrich  to  
y ie ld  to  a somewhat weak program o f  t a x a t i o n .^  On March 16, 1916,
Dr, H e lffe r ich  asked th e  Reichstag fo r  another non -recu rren t war p r o f i t s  ta x , 
a tu rnover ta x  , and an in c rease  in  th e  tobacco t a x , ^  In  June,
1916 a l l  o f  th ese  tax es  were p u t in to  e f f e c t ,  b u t of the  th re e , the 
tobacco ta x  was the  on ly  one which proved f in a n c ia l ly  successfu l in  
1916,  Though th ese  ta x e s , and th e  new and in creased  taxes which 
follow ed, were to  y ie ld  almost nothing in  excess o f th e  ord inary  
budget, they  d id  in d ic a te  a s l ig h t  change o f  p o licy  and outlook. This 
change was a reco g n itio n  by the government th a t  the  war was going to  
l a s t  much lo n g er than  had been expected, and to  some ex ten t a recog­
n i t io n  o f  some o f th e  demands o f the p u b lic  concerning the  financing 
o f the  war.
S h o rtly  a f t e r  th e  in tro d u c tio n  o f  these  new taxes in  I 916, Dr, 
H e lffe rich  l e f t  the  tre a su ry  fo r  the home o ff ic e  and was rep laced  ty
1 Z
Count S ie g fr ied  von Rodem, a p o l i t i c ia n  and s t a t e s m a n , C o u n t  von 
Rodem follow ed much th e  same p o lic y  as had h is  p redecesso r, th a t  o f
^ E p s te in ,  M atthian E rzberger, p , 332, and S to lp e r German 
Economy 1870-1914-0, p , IO6,
^% uczynski, Loc. C i t . ,  p , 765,
^^E pste in , M atthias E rzberger, p , 332,
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re ly in g  alm ost e n t i r e ly  on loans and as l i t t l e  as p o l i t i c a l ly  
fe a s ib le  on ta x a tio n . His views on Germany’s method o f financing  
th e  war were e f fe c t iv e ly  expressed on A p ril 23^ 1918, when he 
questioned , ” Is  is  p o ssib le  to  c a rry  on a t  th e  same time a good loan 
p o licy  and a  good ta x  po licy? I t  seems d oub tfu l to  ma.”^  ]h th is  
sta tem ent Count von Rodern r e f e r s  to  the  tremendous success of the 
German borrowing program in  the financing  of the w ar, and o ffe rs  an 
excuse fo r  the  in e f fe c tiv e  ta x a tio n  program. He a lso  recognizes 
B r i ta in ’s su p e rio r  ta x  program, and p o in ts  out th a t  B r i ta in ’s 
borrowing program f e l l  behind Germany’s in  th e  ra is in g  of funds. In 
h is  a ttem pt to  ju s t i f y  Germany’s war financing  program he seems to  
have com pletely ignored the p o s s ib i l i ty  o f a program which would 
combine th e  advantages o f both methods of war f in an c in g .
Not a l l  among the upper c la s se s  were in  agreement w ith  the 
government’s p o s it io n . A lbert B a llin , prominent German businessman 
and p o l i t i c ia n ,  wrote to  th e  S ec re ta ry  of S ta te  fo r  N ational Economy 
in  September o f 1917 advocating an increase  in  d i r e c t  and in d ire c t 
ta x a tio n , and a red u c tio n  of indebtedness.^®  The s o c ia l i s t s ,  accord­
ing to  Scheidemann, were lik ew ise  fo r  a program of ta x a tio n , but they 
wanted a ta x  program which would f a l l  more upon the  war p ro f i te e r s  
and th e  Junkers .^^  One re p o r t  a lso  in d ic a te s  th a t  perhaps th e re  were
^K uczynsk i, Loc. G it . ,  p . 781.
^®Hernbard Huldermann, A lb e rt B a l l in ,  t r .  by W. J .  Eggers 
(London, 1922), p. 27$.
^Scheidem ann, Memoirs o f a S o c ia l Democrat, pp. 311, 2lt7.
many w ith in  th e  R eichstag who were not convinced of the m erits  of the
e x is tin g  program of f in an ce .
When in  February l a s t  Count von Rodern t r ie d  to  persuade th e  
R eichstag th a t  i t  was not Germany's l i a b i l i t y  th a t  was being 
p iled  up b u t th a t  of her enemies, h is  a c tu a l words — 'a g a in s t 
the  demand of our enemies fo r  rep a ra tio n  we s h a ll  be able to  
put th e  word indem nity ' — had not a very hopeful r in g .20
Count von R odem 's 1917 ta x  program, as adopted by the R eichstag ,
e s ta b lish e d  a 20^ supplement to  the 1916 war or excess p ro f i ts  tax ,
placed a 20^ ta x  on the p rice  o f co a l a t  the  p i t ,  and introduced a
f a i r l y  high ta x  on ra ilw ay  f a r e s . 21 The 1918 program extended the war
ta x  fo r  ano ther year and increased  the tobacco, b eer, spark ling  wine,
c o ffe e , t e a ,  and cocoa d u t ie s ,  and ra ise d  th e  g en era l s a le s  ta x  from
1 Reichsmark per thousand to  5 Reichsmarks per thousand.22
D espite  th i s  in crease  in  th e  r a te s  o f e x is te n t  taxes and the
in tro d u c tio n  of new ta x e s , th e  revenue covered a very sm all amount of
the war connected expend itu res. In th e  f a l l  of 1916, the borrowing
program f a i le d  to  provide th e  funds necessary  fo r  the coverage of the
f lo a tin g  d eb t, sh o rt term  in f la t io n a ry  borrow ing,^3 Since the
government was not w ill in g  to  in crease  ta x a tio n  in  order to  cope with
the s i tu a t io n ,  the f lo a t in g  debt continued to  expand, and in f la t io n
2®H. j . Jenn ings, "Germany's F in a n c ia l Outlook," The N ineteenth 
Century IÆXXIII (F eb ., 1918), p . 372,
2lKuczynski, Loc. C it . ,  pp. 772-773.
2 2 pp.  772-779.
2%irth, Loc. C i t . ,  p. U.
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became another means of German war f in a n c e . Perhaps tax a tio n  on an
adequate sca le  would have caused resentm ent among the taxpaying
c la s se s  and would have exposed th e  r e a l  c h a rac te r  of the "indemnity
2kmyth" as one B r i t i s h  c r i t i c  a s s e r t s .  Evidence seems to  show, 
however, th a t  most Germans a t  t h i s  time s t i l l  believed in the 
"indem nity myth," and th a t  cond itions did not ye t w arrant a change in  
th is  b e l ie f .
The ta b le  fo llo w ir^  i l l u s t r a t e s  th e  ex ten t to  which the 
borrowing program f a i le d  to  cover the f lo a tin g  deb t a f t e r  19T6.^^
War Loan Date Amount
Subscribed*
Treasury b i l l s  outs­
a t  end of period of 
su b scrip tio n *
.1 Sept. 191k k,U60 2,632
2 Mar. 1915 9,060 7,209
3 Sept. 1915 12,101 9,691
k Mar. 1916 10,712 10,388
5 S ep t. 1916 10,652 12,766
6 Mar. 1917 13,122 lk,855
7 S ept. 1917 12,626 27,20k
8 Mar. 1918 15,001 38,971
9 S ept. 1918 10,kk3 k9 ,k lk
%In M illions Reichomarks
For a m eaningful ev a lu a tio n  of th e  tax  programs of G reat 
B r i ta in  and Germany, i t  is  necessary to  compare tax  sources and th e i r  
re sp ec tiv e  y ie ld s . Following is  a comparison of the wartime 
financing  programs of G reat B r ita in  and Germany.
^^Jennings, Loc. C i t . ,  p . 379.
2^Karl H e lf fe r ic h , Money, t r .  by Louis In fie ld  (New York, 
1927), p . 228.
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GREAT BRITAIN
Tax Source: ( in  percen t)^  
Customs 
Excise 
E s ta te  
Stamp duty  
Land ta x ,  house duty 
Income ta x ,  includ ing  
super tax  
Excess p r o f i t s  duty 
Land value d u tie s
T o ta l ta x  income, in  
thousands pounds 
s te r l in g  
Other income^
Expenditures
Tax Source: ( in  percen t)
Customs
Excise
E s ta te
Stamp duty
land ta x ,  house duty
Income ta x ,  includ ing  
super ta x
Excess p r o f i t s  duty
Land value d u tie s
T o ta l ta x  income, in  thousands
pounds s te r l in g  6lL,28b
Other income 93,000
Expenditures 2,696,000
* *
Percentage of expenditures covered by; 
Taxation 
Other 
Borrowing
1913 191b 1915 # 1 6
2 0 2 2Ô.6Ô 20.bw 13.69
2b .32 22.32 21. 0b 10.9b
16.66 15.02 10. 6b 6. 0b
6.12 3.91 2.33 1.50
1.65 1.3b .91 .b9
28.98 36.59 bb.bo 39.82
- 0- - 0- .07 27.b2
.U5 .22 .13 .10
* *  *
163,035, 190,072 290,873 516,513
25,2083 36,000 b6,ooo 56,000
I97,ii92 566,000 1,559,000 2,197,000
1917 1M8 T otalmmmmmm 1931-1918
11.5b 13.15 lb .3 3
6.28 7.58 10.77
5.17 3.92 6.39
1.39 1.58 1.79
.b3 .32 .5b
38.77 37.27 39.02
36.32 36.09 27.05
.10 .09 .11
786,803
102,000
2.579.000 
*
2,398,515
333,000
6 . 873.000
2,398,515
333,000
9,597,000
21.98%
3.16%
71.56%
iThe f ig u re s  from which these  percentages are  computed appear 
in  Kucznyski, Loc. C it . ,  p . 786. The t o t a l  revenue f ig u re s ,  except 
fo r  1913, a re  found in  Stamp, Taxation During the  War, p . 2h9.
^ h i s  in c lu d es: ne t r e c e ip ts  from crown lan d s, gross post 
o ffic e  r e c e ip ts ,  r e c e ip ts  of c i v i l  d e p t . ,  e tc .
3In 62 H. C. Deb. 5 s , p . 60, the amount of o th er income i s  not 
g iven, but the t o t a l  ta x  includ ing  o th e r income is  given as fl98 ,2L 3^
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GERMANT
Tax Source: ( in  p e rcen t)^ 1913 191b 1915 1916
Customs b t m 25:755 253T È3.13
Excise 39.05 3b. 7b 36.b3 bb.59
Stamp duty 15.03 8.09 11.62 16.63
T ra f f ic  ta x e s , including 
s t a t i s t i c s  fee s .12 .05 .07 6.01
Purchase ta x —0““ —O'"" -0 -
E s ta te  ta x 2.7b 1.9b 3.b3 b.32
P roperty  ta x —0— -0 - —0— —0—
Increment to  r e a l
p roperty .90 .13 .06 .Ob
One tim e taxes .05 28.b8 21.65 b.32
Other 2.00 
* *
1.52
*
l.b3 .96
T o ta l ta x  income, in  M illions
Reichsmarks 1,693.8 2,238.5  l,k 2 2 .0  1,505.0
Other income^ 523.9 112.2 313.2 523.9
E xpenditures;
Ordinary 2,U26.5 1,653.2 1,785.6 2,973.8
War 111.1). 7 ,000.6 23,922.8 2 b ,767.1
T o ta l ^
Tax Source; ( in  p ercen t) .1917 1918 1911-1918
Customs 3.26 2.2b 8.96
Excise 16.83 3b. 2b 28.51
Stamp duty 6.52 8.61 8.63
T ra f f ic  ta x e s , including
s t a t i s t i c s  fees  2.97 8.89 b.56
Purchase ta x  _o_ 2.53 .83
E s ta te  ta x  .98 1.31 1.67
P roperty  ta x  l .b 2  1.50 l.Ob
Increment to  r e a l  
p roperty  .02 .01 .03
One time tax es  67.93 b 0 .6 l  b5.3b
Other .07 .06 .b3^
T o ta l ta x  income in  M illions , ,  ̂  ̂  ̂  ̂ ,
Reichsmarks 7 ,lb b .6  5,935.8  %8,2b6.b
Other income 685.8 858.9 2,b9b.O
Expenditures;
Ordinary 6 ,893.6  7 ,lb 6 .0  20,b52.2
War b 5 ,121.8 3 6 ,88b.7 137,697.0^
Percentage of expenditures covered by;
Taxation l8 ,2 b 6 .b  11.53%
(NtKT , 2,b9b.O 1.57%
Borrowing I3 7 ,5 b l.0  86.90%
^ h e  f ig u re s  from which these oercentages are computed 
appear in  M irth , G i t . ,  pp. 31-38.
^This in c lu d es; export d u t ie s ,  funds from the government 
liq u o r monopoly, su rp luses o r d e f i c i t s  from government owned e n te r ­
p r is e s ,  ta x  on bank n o tes, e tc .
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From th is  co itçarison , se v e ra l fa c to rs  not p reviously  discussed 
become apparent regard ing  the war financing  a c t iv i t i e s  of each 
country . A comparison of the t o t a l  y early  ta x  y ie ld  d isc lo ses  th a t 
G reat B r ita in  by the  end of f i s c a l  year 1918 had increased her revenue 
from ta x a tio n  li.8 tim es over f i s c a l  year 1913. Germany's revenue 
from ta x a tio n  had increased by the end of f i s c a l  year 1917 to  L.2 
tim es th a t  of f i s c a l  year 1913. The decrease of German revenue which 
occurred in  1918 can be a t t r ib u te d  to  the  f in a n c ia l  and economic 
d istu rbance  caused by th e  unsuccessfu l conclusion of the war during 
th a t  f i s c a l  y ea r. While th is  increase  in  tax a tio n  revenue i s  s im ila r , 
i t  should be noted th a t  th i s  increase  in  German revenue occurred in 
one y ear, 1917, and does not re p re sen t a steady yearly  increase in  
tax  re tu rn s  as was the case in  G reat B r i ta in .  The large tax  re tu rn s
of Germany in  1917 and 1918 are accounted fo r  by the new and
increased tax es  introduced in  1917.
A c lo se r  exam ination shows th a t  in  Great B r i ta in ,  while the 
monetary revenue from alm ost every tax  item increased considerab ly , 
the  lai% est in c re a se , in d iv id u a l ta x  to  t o t a l  tax  y ie ld , came from 
the income ta x  and the excess p ro f i ts  du ty . The income tax  in  1913 
accounted fo r  only 29.0# of th e  t o t a l  revenue, w hile in  1918 the 
income ta x  and the  excess p ro f i ts  ta x  y ielded  73.3# of the t o t a l  
revenue. In Germany a f t e r  f i s c a l  year 191^, the monetary revenue 
from taxes a lso  in creased , the notable exception being the customs 
ta x . While 80.7# of the  governmental income in  1913 was provided by
the  customs and excise  ta x e s , th a t  percentage dropped to  20.0# in
^0
1917. In 1917 t t e  ex trao rd in a ry  war ta x  or excess p ro f i ts  ta x  was 
the la rg e s t  c o n tr ib u to r  to  c e n tr a l  government revenue, y ie ld in g  
67.9% o f th e  t o t a l  ta x  revenue fo r  th a t  year.
I t  i s  apparent th a t  G reat B r ita in  while s te a d ily  increasing  
taxes during  the war p erio d , sh if te d  her emphasis to  la rg e  revenue 
producing and g en era lly  popular ta x e s . Germany, however, did not 
increase  tax  r a te s  or change ta x  p o licy  u n t i l  f i s c a l  year 1916 when 
the  government y ielded  very s l ig h t ly  to  a popular tax  program. In 
the  case of the  ex trao rd in ary  war tax  or excess p ro f i ts  tax  which 
did have popular support w ith in  the  coun try , the ta x  was non-recurrent 
and did not apply e f fe c t iv e ly  to  in d iv id u a ls . The income ta x , a 
g en era lly  popular ta x ,  was never in i t ia te d  in  Germany, but a sa le s  
ta x ,  a ta x  u sually  unpopular among the low income groups was es tab ­
lish ed  in  19I8 and proved m oderately su ccessfu l in revenue re tu rn .
A comparison of ta x  source a lso  re v e a ls  th a t  Germany exerted 
a much g re a te r  e f f o r t  in  c o n tro llin g  consumption through the use of 
the  excise  ta x  than  did G reat B r i ta in .  Of p a r t ic u la r  note are the 
German co a l ta x  and the  passenger t i c k e t  ta x ,  taxes on items exten­
s iv e ly  used by th e  g o v e r n m e n t .W h i le  th e  excise  tax es  on many o ther 
item s, as tobacco and a lco h o lic  beverages, were not only consumption 
c o n tro ll in g , but revenue producing, the  excise taxes on goods which 
were ex ten s iv e ly  used by the government were not revenue producing, 
bu t r a th e r  a t r a n s f e r  of governmental funds from income, to  expense, 
to  income. This f a c to r  leads to  the conclusion  th a t  the taxes lev ied
^^Mendelssohn B artholdy, The War and German S ocie ty , p. 88.
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on th ese  goods were lev ied  f o r  th e  purpose of c o n tro llin g  consumption 
ra th e r  than fo r  producing revenue.
S ince ta x  r a te s  remained unchanged in  Germany through f i s c a l  
year 1915, s e v e ra l f a c to rs  appear in  a comparison of the  y ie ld s  fo r 
these y e a rs . The revenue from cnstomS taxes decreased by the
re tu rn  from the  excise  taxes by 21 ,7^, and the  stamp taxes by 
This in d ic a te s  a s c a rc i ty  of such iteqis as w e ll as a reduction  in  the 
consumption of these  item s. The stamp ta x  on s e c u r i t ie s ,  business 
a c q u is itio n s  and t ra n s f e r s  of r e a l  e s ta te  y ielded much le s s  in  f i s c a l  
year 19%5 than  in  f i s c a l  year 19X3 In d ica tin g  th a t  fewer tra n sa c tio n s  
occurred in  th ese  a reas  than during th e  pre-war y ears . The notable 
in creases  in  re tu rn s  were the tobacco ta x , a  r e s u l t  of the  increased 
consumption, and th e  stamp ta x  on companies and on insurance, a 
r e s u l t  of an increase  in  the number o f new businesses and in  the number 
of new insurance p o l ic ie s .  This increase  in  companies can p a r t ia l ly  
be explained by the high p r o f i t s  a v a ilab le  in  the f ie ld  of war 
p roduction . The increase  in  ta x  revenue from the insurance tax  is  
accounted f o r  by the increased  insurance sa le s  during the war period .
F inance, while a minor item when viewing the  t o t a l  human and 
economic demands of war, i s  an in d ic a tio n  of the a t t i tu d e s  and aims 
of those possessing  in fluence w ith in  th e  government of a country. In 
the case of G reat B r i ta in ,  those making th e  f in a n c ia l  dec is io n s  depend­
ed upon th e  public fo r  the support of such dec is ions and could not 
p o l i t i c a l ly  affo rd  to  go a g a in s t pub lic  opin ion . In Germany, however, 
those resp o n sib le  fo r  the f in a n c ia l  d ec is io n s  depended a g re a t d ea l
$2
upon th e  a r is to c ra c y  and the m ili ta ry  fo r  the support of th e i r  program. 
They developed a program which would e n l i s t  the  support of these two 
c la s s e s ,  and y e t would not a l ie n a te  or overburden the  lower income 
groups. Under th is  program, those w ith  money would finance the war 
through lo an s, and th e o r e t ic a l ly  the  low income groups would not exper­
ience th e  f in a n c ia l  burden of th e  war. Upon the completion of the 
war, those who had done the financing  would be repaid  w ith in te re s t  
f o r  t h e i r  f in a n c ia l  support of the war e f f o r t  from the funds obtained 
in  the indemnity se ttlem en ts  w ith  the defeated  n a tio n s. This program 
won considerab le  su pport, fo r  i t  appeared th a t no one, except the 
defeated  n a tio n s , would s u f fe r  f in a n c ia l  burden. Adding support to  
th i s  program was the memory of the  su c ce ss fu l indemnity se ttlem en t 
w ith France in  1871, This a t t i tu d e  was c le a r ly  incorporated in to  the 
peace se ttlem en t w ith  R ussia in  e a rly  1918 a t  B rest-L itovsk  where in  
ad d itio n  to  annexations, the  sum of s ix  b i l l io n  marks was in se rted  as 
compensation fo r  German l o s s e s . 27 To t h i s  peace se ttlem en t th e re  were 
few o b jec tio n s w ith in  th e  R eichstag , even amorg the  S o c ia l Democrats
who, i f  they did not vote fo r  the peace se ttlem en t, did not vote a t
Pfia l l , ^  I t  i s  thus apparent th a t  even a t  th i s  tim e, e a rly  1918, Germany 
supported a f in a n c ia l  po licy  which would finance th e  war expenditures 
through indemnity se ttlem en ts  w ith  th e  defea ted .
*  * *
27john ¥. Wheeler-Bennett, Brest-Litovsk, The Forgotten Peace, 
March 19l8 (London, 1938), pp. U39-U6,
rt Q
Scheidemann, Memoirs of a S o c ia l Democrat, p . 125.
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In  G reat B r i ta in ,  from I91Î4 on, the ta x  program was s te a d ily  
increased and expanded, and two new concepts were introduced in to  the 
f ie ld  of war f in a n ce : one, a system fo r  th e  q u a r te r ly  assessment and 
c o lle c tio n  of the  income ta x , a f a c to r  which f a c i l i t a te d  the payment 
of the  income tax  by the workers and o ther low and fixed  income 
groups; two, the in s i t iu t io n  of a system fo r  the continuous sa le  of 
war bonds, a system which provided a continuous inflow of money and 
reduced the need fo r  bank c r e d i t .  Germany, on the o ther hand, made 
no attem pt to  expand her ta x  program beyond providing the funds 
necessary f o r  financing  the o rd inary  o r , non-war expenditu res.
Although a c e r ta in  amount of expansion did occur, th is  was made 
necessary by the decrease in  revenue, p a r t ic u la r ly  customs revenue, 
and by th e  in f la t io n a ry  a c t iv i ty  which began to  expand ra p id ly  in  
1915 follow ing th e  f a i lu r e  of the 1916 and subsequent war loans to  
cover th e  f lo a tin g  d eb t.
One area  in  which the f in a n c ia l  programs of both co u n trie s  f e l l  
sh o rt was the  area  of excess p r o f i ts  ta x a tio n . N either country saw 
f i t  to  tak e  the p r o f i t  out of war p roduction . In try in g  to  remedy the 
s i tu a t io n  and l im it  the  excess p r o f i t s  due to  war production G reat 
B r ita in  took the  le a d , her ta x  on excess p ro f i ts  reached a ra te  of 
80^ by 1918, w hile Germany never exceeded a 2(% ta x  on excess p r o f i t s .
D espite th e  program each country  c a rrie d  out fo r  the  financing 
of war ex p en d itu res , th e  people did not f a i l  to  meet the demands. 
Whether i t  was through taxes or lo an s, the peoples of both nations 
supported th e i r  re sp ec tiv e  co u n trie s  w ith  the needed funds. When the 
German d e fe a t did come, i t  was not due to  a lack  of f in a n c ia l  support 
or n a tio n a l lo y a lty ,  i t  came about because of an increasing  lack  of 
f a i th  in  the  m il i ta ry ,  and of th e  m i l i ta ry ,^9 and a lack  of food and 
coat fo r  the ensuing w in te r .3^
^^Lutz, e d . .  The Causes of the  German Collapse in  19X8, p . 97.
^^ Ib id . ,  p . 122, and P rin ce  Louis Ferdinand, Memoirs of The 
Rebel P rin c e , (Chicago, 1952), p. h3*
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BÏILOGtJE: THE SECOND WGRID WAR
3h September, Ï939, the governments of Europe were once again 
faced w ith  war, the  Second World War. In th is  war, finance was to  
p lay  a ro le  s im ila r  to  th a t  which i t  had played in  the F i r s t  World 
War, This tim e, however, th e re  was a no ticeab le  d iffe ren ce  in the 
speed and th e  means w ith  which the f in a n c ia l  problems were approached 
and acted upon. Both G reat B r ita in  and Germany had gained consider­
ab le  knowledge from th e  f in a n c ia l  experiences of the F i r s t  World War.
The f in a n c ia l  experiences of G reat B rita in  and Germany in  the 
F i r s t  World War determined to  a g re a t ex te n t th e i r  a t t i tu d e s  and 
ac tio n s  in  the financing  of the Second World War, At the time of the 
outbreak of the  Second World War in  the f a l l  of 1939, Germany had in  
opera tion  a system f o r  th e  reg u la tio n  of her e x is te n t war economy 
and fo r  th e  fin an cin g  of her a n tic ip a te d  war expend itu res. G reat 
B r i ta in ,  w hile not geared to  a war economy, had made d e f in ite  p repar­
a tio n s  f o r  war financing  and was ab le  to  e s ta b lis h  by the f a l l  of
1914.0 a system of financing  which, w ith  minor m o d ifica tio n s , ca rried  
her through the  war.
m  Germany a f t e r  World War I ,  the  governmental adm in istra tive  
fu n c tio n s  had been changed in  favo r of a c e n tra l  ad m in istra tio n . And 
a f te r  the r i s e  of th e  Nazi government, a regime unhindered by the 
ru le s  of a c o n s ti tu t io n a l  government, no regard  was given to  the
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t r a d i t io n s  and a n t i - c e n t r a l  tendencies of the s ta te s .  This war to o , 
was to  be a war between a dem ocratic and a non-democratic government.
In  the Immediate pre-w ar y e a rs , th e  Nazi government had 
a tta in e d  such a degree of c o n tro l over wages, p r ic e s , and investments 
th a t  few changes were deemed necessary  in  e i th e r  the  laws governing 
c r e d i t  o r th e  e x is tin g  ta x  p o lic y . By means of the  decree of March U, 
I93li, the  Nazis had reorganized th e  stock  exchanges in  such a manner 
th a t  only new issu es  of stock  rep re sen tin g  businesses which would 
serve the needs of a war economy were p erm itted . The decree of 
March 29, W3h requ ired  th a t  co rp o ra tio n s d ec laring  dividends in  
excess o f the previous year in v es t the in c re a se , so f a r  as i t  exceeded 
6%, in  pub lic  lo a n s .2 These l im ita tio n  laws were enacted in  order to  
f a c i l i t a t e  governmental fin an c in g , f o r  by s tim u la tin g  th e  corporations 
to  finance c a p i ta l  requirem ents out of p r o f i t s ,  the influence of the 
stock  exchanges as a p o l i t i c a l ly  d is tu rb in g  fa c to r  could be e lim inated .
On December 5 , 19314, a new bank and c r e d i t  law was in i t i a te d .  
This decree es tab lish ed  a superv iso ry  board w ith  c o n tro l over a l l  
banks and c re d it  in s t i tu t io n s  by means of lic e n s in g , superv ision  of 
a u d its ,  c r e d i t  re g u la tio n , and in  emergency s i tu a t io n s ,  ac tio n  on 
beh alf of th ese  in s t i t u t i o n s .3 Thus the Nazis e s tab lish ed  a
% axine Y. Sweezv, The S tru c tu re  of th e  Nazi Economy (Cambridge, 
M ass., 1 9 W , pp.
2I b id . ,  p . Ï31*
3I b id . ,  pp. ÜU-Î37.
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c e n tra liz e d  c o n tro l over th e  c a p i ta l  and money m arkets, a co n tro l 
which they  exercised  f o r  f iv e  years before th e  a c tu a l outbreak of war.
Immediately upon th e  outbreak of war, September, 1939, Germany 
in s t i tu te d  th e  War Economy Decree which increased the  income tax  by 
50^ and ra ise d  the co rporation  tax  on corporate  incomes of over
100,000 RM to  iiO^.^ In 19Ul, th e  excess p ro f i ts  ta x  was introduced 
and ra n  co n cu rren tly  w ith  the co rp o ra tio n  ta x . This I9 h l ac tio n  
e s ta b lish ed  an e f fe c tiv e  tax  r a te  on excess income over th e  1.938 base 
a t  from 70^ to  9Q#.^
* * *
In G reat B r i ta in ,  due to  the  ex is ten ce  of a democratic form of 
government, such an e ffe c tiv e  program was not p o ssib le  u n t i l  the 
a c tu a l outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s .  In f a c t ,  one source s ta te s  th a t  the 
B r i t is h  pub lic  was not ready f o r  the  ta x  program desired  by many 
w ith in  the government u n t i l  th e  end of the "phoney war" when the 
German fo rc e s  invaded the N etherlands and Belgium.^ At th a t  tim e, 
the summer 191+0, a new government took o f f ic e  and introduced a tax  
program which endured w ith  few changes throughout the remainder of 
the war. The Ju ly , 19U0 supplementary budget and subsequent budgets 
increased ta x a tio n  to  the po in t of absorbing a l l  of th e  excess
^ I b id . ,  pp. l$ 2 - lS k .
5h. W. S in g er, "The German War Economy, 71," The Economic 
Jo u rn a l, 111 (191+2), p . 202.
^R. S. S ayers, F in an c ia l P o licy  1939-1+5 (London, 1956),
p. 1+1+.
^8
porc basing power. The income and su rtax  were ra ised  immediately, as 
was th e  excess p r o f i t s  ta x  which was increased to  TDÔ . W ithholding 
of th e  income ta x  from wages and s a la r ie s  was made compulsory, and a 
purchase ta x  to  co n tro l th e  consumption of goods was in tro d u ced .7
In the 19I4.I  budget, a system  of forced savings was introduced. 
The amount to  be c o lle c te d  and placed in  th e  forced savings account 
was determ ined on a graduated b a s is ,  th e  percentage being h ighest 
among th e  low income groups and alm ost n eg lig ib le  in  the h igher income 
b rac k e ts . The savings accumulated by in d iv id u a ls  under th i s  program 
were to  be re tu rned  to  th e  in d iv id u a l a t  the  end of the  war when the 
government no longer needed the funds and when consumer luxury goods 
would once again be availab le .®
A s im ila r  savings program was u t i l iz e d  by Germany in order to  
ob tain  funds from wage and s a la ry  e a rn e rs . The amount saved under the  
« iron sav ings” program was to  be retu rned  a year a f te r  th e  term ination  
of h o s t i l i t i e s .  These two s im ila r  programs while producing almost 
n e g lig ib le  amounts fo r  war fin a n c in g , did help to  l im it  consumption 
and to  curb in f la t io n  by lim itin g  the  amount a v a ilab le  to  th e  worker 
fo r  spending.9 These programs a lso  won a g re a t d ea l of pub lic  support.
^ Ib id . , pp. U6-U9 
®Ibid. ,  pp. 80-85.
^ H. ¥. S in g e r , «The German War Economy, V," The Economic 
Jo u rn a l, LIT ( l9 l2 ) ,  p. 33.
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p a r t ic u la r ly  among th e  lower income groups, in th a t  they provided fo r  
a p a r t i a l  r e tu rn  of the war c o n tr ib u tio n s .
Following i s  a summary of th e  Second World War financing  
o p era tions as c a rr ie d  on by G reat B r ita in  and Germany.
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GREAT BRJTAIN
Tax Source: ( in  p e rc e n t)! 1938 1939 19kO 19kl
Customs & Excise 3W.k7 38.98 3k. 30 31.5kIncome & su rtax L2.35 11.83 39.87 3k.58
N ational defense 
c o n tr ib u tio n s 1.71 2.86 1.7k 1.07
Excess p r o f i t s  duty -0 - 3.18 9.83
Death d u tie s 8.91 7.86 3.72 k . l l
Mar damage premiums -0 - -0 - -0 - 3.50
Motor v eh ic le  d u tie s li.OO 3.k7 2.68 1.77
Stamp d u tie s 2.10 1.9k 1.01 .63
Post o f f ic e  su rp lus 1.26 .82 1.37 1.1?
War r i s k  insurance premiums l.k 3 8.97 11.13
Other .90 1,16 .61
T o ta l tax  income, in  m illio n s  
pounds s te r l in g  876 980 1,382 2 ,lk3
Tax Source: ( in  percen t) I 9U2 19k3 19iiii 19k3
T otal 
1939- I9kk
Customs & Excise 33.20 32.30 33.35 33 .k3 33.33
Income & su rta x 35.93 38.79 kl.L8 k6.68 38.36
N ational defense 
c o n trib u tio n s 1.03 1.08 1.07 1.0k 1.27
Excess p r o f i t s  duty 12. ill Ik .8k  Ik . 78 13.58 11.27
Death d u tie s 3.67 3.18 3.28 3.6k k.05
War Damage premiums 2.38 1.78 1.30 1.19 1.82
Motor v eh ic le  d u tie s 1.23 .88 .86 1.07 l.k 7
Stamp d u tie s .62 .36 .32 .70 .73
P ost o f f ic e  su rp lus 1.21 1.18 1,20 1.13 1.18
War r i s k  insurance Premiums 7.76 k.98 1.78 .k3 5.87
Other .32 .22 .18 .19 .k3
T o ta l ta x  income, in  m illio  
pounds s te r l in g  2,
*
§&3 3
* *
,032 3,262 3,263 13,382
#
percen tage of expenditures covered 
Taxation & o th er income 
Borrowing & Lend Lease^
by:
13,619
21,732
38.38%
6l.L2%
%he f ig u re s  from which th ese  percentages are computed appear 
in  S ayers, F in an c ia l P o licy  1939-U3, p. U93.
2Lend Lease according to  S ayers, F in an c ia l Policy 1939-L3, 
p .373, equalled  7,liUU m illio n s  pounds s te r l in g .  Borrowing according 
to  the  Bank fo r  In te rn a tio n a l S e ttlem en ts , Fourteenth  Annual R eport, 
p . l80 , and the F if te e n th  Annual R eport, p . 7b, equalled ïh ,2üü 
m illio n s  pounds s te r l in g .
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GERMNY
Tax Source: ( in  p e rc e n t)^ 1938 1939 1910 19iil
Customs 1T 39 7.20 5.0? 7 3 3
Excise 18.35 1 8 .6L 20.29 20.20
P ersonal income tax 31.18 31.75 38.77 12.67
P roperty  ta x 2.53 1.69 2.17 1.96
Turnover ta x 21.52 15.68 Hi. 13 13.68
C orporation ta x 15.19 13.56 12.68 16.61
Other^ (3.16) 8.L8 6.89 1.30
T o ta l ta x  income, in  b i l l io n s
Reichsmarks 15.8 23.6 27.6 30.7
T otal
Tax Source: ( in  percen t) 1&2 19U3 19iili^ I939-I9ii3
Customs li.Ub 1 .88 — ÎÏ.T5....
Excise # .3 8 ]^U8l I7.61i
P ersonal income ta x 31.13 12.01 37.68
P roperty  ta x 1.73 2.19 1.95
Turnover tax ID.UO 13.17 13.10
C orporation tax 17.08 21.00 I6.ii7
Other 22.52 .9li 8.88
* * *
T o ta l ta x  income, in  b i l l io n s
Reichsmarks ho.h 33.9 28.5 157.2
* * *
Percentage of expenditures covered by:
Taxation 182.7 26.59%
Borrowing 270.8 39.12%
Indem nities from conquered nations
and s e c re t  borowings 233.5 33.99%
%he f ig u re s  from which th ese  percentages are  computed appear
in  Richard ¥ . Lindholm, "German Finance in  World War I I ,"  The
American Economic Review, XXX7II,(l9li7), p . 127.
^Includes war c o n tr ib u tio n s , redemption of r e a l  e s ta te  tax , 
and is  minus the quotas to  th e  s ta te s .
^The breakdown of tax  re c e ip ts  fo r  f i s c a l  year i s  not
a v a ila b le .
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In  comparing th e  financing  programs of the F i r s t  and Second 
World Wars, the increase  in  expenditure coverage by tax  and o ther 
revenue is  p a r t ic u la r ly  conspicuous. This fa c to r  is  not only tru e  of 
G reat B r ita in  which increased i t s  expenditure coverage from 2Q,hh% 
to  38. 58^ ,  but a lso  of Germany which increased i t s  expenditure 
coverage from 13.%0% to  26.^9%.
Ih the Second World War, the personal income tax  provided the 
la rg e s t  s in g le  revenue re tu rn  in  th e  budgets of both co u n tr ie s . In 
Germany the  p ersonal income ta x  yielded  a percentage of the t o t a l  ta x  
revenue s im ila r  to  th a t  of G reat B r ita in . This fa c to r  is  p a r t ic u la r ly  
outstand ing  when one considers th a t  Germany had no e f fe c tiv e  personal 
income ta x  in  her F i r s t  World War financing  program.
In the  Second World War experience, the budgetary re tu rn s  of 
both co u n tr ie s  in d ic a te  a f a i r l y  s ta b le  monetary cond ition  and in d i­
ca te  th a t  in f la t io n  was minimal. Through th e i r  varied ta x  and 
borrowing programs the governments of both co u n trie s  were successfu l 
in  drawing o ff  th e  excess purchasing power of the p u b lic . This 
success while perhaps accomplished through an extrem ely regu la ted  
f in a n c ia l  system , was a r e s u l t  of the experience gained in  the F i r s t  
World War when re g u la tio n , i f  in i t ia te d  a t  a l l ,  was in i t ia te d  a f te r  
a n o n -in te rfe ren ce  po licy  proved inadequate. F in an c ia l measures 
which had proven necessary in  th e  F i r s t  World War were e i th e r  in  
op era tio n  or were introduced s h o r t ly  a f te r  the outbreak of the Second 
World War.
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In  th e  Second World War fin an cin g  programs of both G reat B rita in  
and Germany, e f fe c t iv e  and q u ite  su cc e ss fu l e f fo r ts  were made toward 
r e s t r i c t in g  in f la t io n ,  d ire c tin g  investm ent, and lim itin g  consumption. 
And once ag ain , as in  the F i r s t  World War, the peoples of both 
co u n trie s  proved adequate in  meeting th e i r  government's f in a n c ia l  
demands fo r  th e  war e f f o r t .
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